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Preparing for Disaster: Protecting
the Most Vulnerable in Emergencies
Sharona Hoffman∗
Many federal, state, local, and private entities are investing significant
resources in disaster readiness initiatives. Often disregarded in these
initiatives, however, are the special needs of vulnerable populations during
disasters. In the context of emergencies, vulnerable groups may include
individuals with disabilities, pregnant women, children, elderly persons,
prisoners, certain members of ethnic minorities, people with language
barriers, and the impoverished. The fate of the disadvantaged during
disasters has received little attention in the legal literature, and this
Article begins to fill that gap. Through an examination of normative
distributive justice arguments, existing federal and state civil rights
provisions, and emergency response laws, it argues that existing legal and
ethical frameworks entitle vulnerable populations to significant protection.
It also, however, highlights the shortcomings of the current statutory
scheme as it relates to the needs of the disadvantaged during disasters and
urges legislators to supplement these laws with additional requirements.
Moreover, the Article argues that for vulnerable populations, successful
disaster response is dependent upon careful planning. With this in mind,
the Article develops a proposal for statutory provisions that will mandate
adequate preparation to safeguard the welfare of the vulnerable in
emergencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Preparing for disasters has been high on the agendas of many
federal, state, local, and private entities for several years.1 For
example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and
state public health departments are undertaking major emergency
planning initiatives, including extensive training and educational
programs.2 Several recent governmental reports and statements also
address emergency readiness in the United States.3 The federal
government has spent over $10 billion on emergency preparedness
activities since 2001.4
These efforts, however, often disregard the special needs of
vulnerable populations. During and after a catastrophic event,
vulnerable populations may include individuals with disabilities,
pregnant women, children, the elderly, prisoners, ethnic minorities,
people with language barriers, and the impoverished.5 A review of
1
Dennis P. Andrulis et al., Preparing Racially and Ethnically Diverse Communities
for Public Health Emergencies, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1269, 1269 (2007) (“The White House,
Congress, and State and local governments have made emergency preparedness one of
their highest priorities.”); Aaron Katz et al., Preparing for the Unknown, Responding to
the Known: Communities and Public Health Preparedness, 25 HEALTH AFF. 946, 946
(2006) (finding that “bioterrorism preparedness remains a high priority for federal,
state, and local governments” and that “the capabilities of local public health and
emergency response agencies” had improved significantly since 2004).
2
See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-4(a)(3) (2006) (providing that “Secretary shall expand,
enhance, and improve the capabilities of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention relating to [public health emergency] preparedness”); see also Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006) (establishing
grants for state and local governments to undertake activities designed to enhance
public health emergency preparedness); Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
Public Health Law Program, http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/about.asp (last visited Feb.
19, 2009) (describing emergency preparedness activities of CDC’s Public Health Law
Program); Washington State Department of Health, Public Health Emergency
Preparedness and Response Preparedness: Information for Local Health Agencies and
Health Care Providers, http://www.doh.wa.gov/phepr/pheprlho.htm (last visited Feb.
19, 2009).
3
See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FEMA’S
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER (2008), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-34_Mar08.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT:
OBSERVATIONS ON DHS’S PREPAREDNESS FOR
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS (2008) (statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Dir. Homeland Sec.
& Justice), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08868t.pdf.
4
Rebecca Katz & Jeffrey Levi, Should a Reformed System Be Prepared for Public
Health Emergencies, and What Does That Mean Anyway?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 716,
717 (2008).
5
ASS’N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
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thirty-seven national pandemic preparedness plans from Europe, Asia
and the Pacific Rim, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas
revealed that “none of the plans suggested any systematic attempt to
identify” disadvantaged groups.6 Furthermore, fewer than twenty-five
plans considered the needs of “one or more economically or socially
disadvantaged group[s].”7
Inadequate preparation for the needs of vulnerable populations can
lead to catastrophic consequences. The disadvantaged could suffer
large death tolls, as illustrated by Hurricane Katrina, in which over
1,800 individuals died because they were unable to evacuate the city.8
The infirm elderly, poor, and disabled were the most likely to die in
that notorious disaster.9 Members of vulnerable populations who
survive could suffer permanent, debilitating injuries and become
unable to work, live independently, and care for themselves.
American taxpayers who pay for public safety-net programs would
thus absorb the cost of increased use of such programs and loss of
economic productivity.
As demonstrated in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, a failed emergency response could also cause the
government to suffer humiliation and the public to lose faith in those
responsible for its welfare.10 These prospects are alarming given the
variety of potential emergencies that experts predict we will face in the

SERVS., AT-RISK POPULATIONS AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR STATE,
TERRITORIAL, TRIBAL, AND LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 3-4 (2008), available at http://
www.astho.org/pubs/ASTHO_ARPP_Guidance_June3008.pdf [hereinafter ASTHO];
HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 30-31
(2005), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/altstand.pdf; Kathleen
Tierney, Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA 109, 112-20 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006); Public Health –
Seattle & King County, Vulnerable Populations Action Team (VPAT),
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/preparedness/VPAT.aspx (last visited
Feb. 20, 2009).
6
Lori Uscher-Pines et al., Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and
Disadvantaged Groups, 37 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 38 (2007).
7
Id.
8
David Hall, Katrina: Spiritual Medicine for Political Complacency and for Social
Activists Who Are Sleepwalking, 23 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (2007).
9
Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden
of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 558-59 (2007) (asserting that over 75 percent of
those who died in Katrina were over 60 years old).
10
L. Darnell Weeden, Hurricane Katrina and the Toxic Torts Implications of
Environmental Injustice in New Orleans, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 35 (2006) (“As a
result of governmental conduct since Katrina, almost all Louisianans now seem to
share a distrust of the government.”).
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coming decades, ranging from bioterrorism attacks to natural disasters
to pandemic influenza outbreaks.11
The vulnerable groups that are the subject of this Article consist of
tens of millions of people.12 According to the United States Census
Bureau, in 2006, 41.3 million noninstitutionalized Americans over the
age of five had disabilities.13 Many more may have physical or mental
impairments that may impact their welfare during an emergency but
are not deemed to be serious enough to constitute reportable
disabilities. In 2006, approximately 35.5 million individuals were
sixty-five years of age or older14 and 38.8 million Americans were
living in poverty.15 Children constitute approximately twenty-five
percent of the United States population.16 Meanwhile, at the end of
2007, approximately 2.3 million individuals were incarcerated in
United States prisons and jails.17 Some subset of each of these groups
will almost certainly have special needs during disasters.
Unless the needs of vulnerable populations are addressed during all
three phases of emergency response operations — pre-event planning
and preparation, the event, and recovery18 — members of these
11
See Taiwo A. Oriola, Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent
Rights as a Biosecurity Strategy, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 289 (“Experts have
frequently warned of the high likelihood of a bioterrorism attack.”); Payal K. Shah,
Assisting and Empowering Women Facing Natural Disasters: Drawing from Security
Council Resolution 1325, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 711, 721 (2006) (“Over the past
decades, experts have documented the increasing impact of natural disasters on the
world’s population, with economic losses from natural disasters increasing more than
ten times each decade.”); Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., The Next Influenza Pandemic:
Can It Be Predicted?, 297 JAMA 2025, 2025 (2007) (“[M]ost experts believe another
influenza pandemic will occur . . . .”).
12
See discussion infra Part I.
13
MATTHEW BRAULT, DISABILITY STATUS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE IN
GROUP QUARTERS: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED AND TOTAL
POPULATIONS IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/GQdisability.pdf.
14
U.S. Census Bureau, Population by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin
(Internet release date: July 27, 2007), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
age/2006older_table1.1.xls. According to a different report, in 2005 one-and-a-half
million Americans resided in nursing homes. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT: HAS IT FULFILLED ITS PROMISE? 7 (2005),
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/pdf/personsect.pdf.
15
BRUCE H. WEBSTER, JR. & ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, INCOME, EARNING, AND POVERTY
DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 20 (2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/acs-08.pdf.
16
INST. OF MED., EMERGENCY CARE FOR CHILDREN: GROWING PAINS 234 (2007).
17
HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PH.D., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN
2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf.
18
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 27 (2008),
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communities are likely to suffer disproportionate harm in disasters.
Their poor outcomes may be linked to lack of physical and emotional
strength or a dearth of the social and economic resources upon which
others rely during disasters. Response and recovery efforts will be
optimized only if decision makers have carefully prepared for
emergencies at a time when they have the leisure to contemplate
options and establish responsible policies. However, planning and
production of planning documents alone are not sufficient to achieve
comprehensive and effective disaster readiness. Rather, at a minimum,
planners must identify at-risk individuals through registries, delegate
authority and responsibility to appropriate governmental officials,
collect supplies, and allocate resources, among other steps.19
Consequently, the terms “planning” and “preparation” in this Article
are meant to include not only the contemplation of response
approaches, but also the implementation of readiness initiatives.
Without appropriate preparation, vulnerable individuals may not be
able to evacuate as instructed, reach points of distribution for medical
countermeasures, understand written or verbal communications
during an emergency, or find suitable housing if their residences are
destroyed during a disaster. For example, while all residents of
affected areas were failed by the response to Hurricane Katrina, the
vulnerable often suffered to a much greater extent than others. The
hearing impaired found that eighty percent of shelters did not have
text telephones (“TTYs”); sixty percent of shelters had no television
with open caption capability; only fifty-six percent of shelters posted
announcements that were otherwise made verbally; and American Sign
Language interpreters were available in fewer than thirty percent of
shelters.20 Meanwhile, low-income African Americans often could not
evacuate because they had no personal transportation.21 Furthermore,
those with mobility impairments found that only five percent of the
temporary housing provided by the Federal Emergency Management

available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf (identifying “three
phases of effective response” as “prepare, respond, and recover”).
19
See infra Part IV.B for recommendations.
20
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE IMPACT OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA ON
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A LOOK BACK AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 14 (2006),
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2006/pdf/hurricanes_impact.
pdf; PAUL CAMPBELL ET AL., HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, REACHING VULNERABLE
POPULATIONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 9 (2007),
available at http://www.mcph.org/Major_Activities/Emergency_Preparedness/2007/
2007_Final_Conference_Report_pdf.
21
Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1269.
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Agency (“FEMA”) was accessible to them even though twenty-five
percent of the displaced population needed accessible housing.22
The fate of the disadvantaged during disasters has received little if
any attention in the legal literature. This Article introduces legal
analysis into the discussion of preparedness for vulnerable
populations.23 Numerous civil rights laws establish that vulnerable
populations have a right to be free of discrimination and to enjoy
certain benefits and governmental protections.24 These rights and
obligations are binding not only during ordinary times, but also
during emergencies. Nevertheless, the existing legal framework must
be supplemented by specific provisions in emergency response laws
that mandate disaster planning to address the needs of vulnerable
populations.
Preparation for the needs of vulnerable groups is most likely to
occur if it is statutorily mandated. These groups often have weak
political voices25 and may not become a focus for governmental
planners without laws requiring agencies to expressly account for the
vulnerable. This Article develops recommendations for federal and
state law provisions that require specific planning activities designed
to safeguard the welfare of the disadvantaged.26 It also explores ethical
theories of distributive justice that address how the government
should allocate scarce resources.27 While the government may not be
able to anticipate and address every need of all vulnerable groups,
experts agree that certain initiatives can improve outcomes for the
vulnerable.28 For example, much can be accomplished by working
with advocacy and community groups and by requiring private
vendors who supply services during disasters to accommodate the
needs of vulnerable groups. In addition, officials must communicate
effectively with all segments of society to educate the public about
what individuals must do for themselves during emergencies.29 State
22

CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 20, at 9.
See infra Part III.
24
See infra Part III.A.
25
Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians’ Fees: Individual
Patients or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 81 (1986) (“The
political voices of . . . those who are medically and economically vulnerable . . . are . . .
diffuse and weak.”).
26
See infra Part IV.B.
27
See infra Part II.
28
See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing experts’ recommendations).
29
See infra Part IV.B.2. See generally ASTHO, supra note 5 (discussing ways to
identify, communicate with, collaborate with, educate, and provide services to at-risk
populations).
23
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and federal emergency response statutes should provide planning
authorities with detailed instructions to ensure that such initiatives are
undertaken.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the question of
who “vulnerable populations” are in the context of disasters. It
identifies and assesses the needs of numerous at-risk groups. Part II
turns to ethical questions concerning how resources should be
allocated in the process of planning for and responding to disasters.
This Part explores whether there are moral justifications for investing
disproportionate resources in accommodating the needs of the
disadvantaged. In so doing, it presents several theories of distributive
justice30 and analyzes how they illuminate the question of resource
allocation for vulnerable populations. Part III examines a variety of
federal and state laws that establish nondiscrimination mandates and
other obligations that public and private entities have towards
vulnerable populations. These include federal and state disability
laws, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Eighth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
similar state laws, and the tort of negligence. These laws reflect a
long-standing commitment to protecting the rights of the vulnerable.
This Part then presents a comprehensive survey of existing federal and
state emergency response laws that include provisions addressing
special needs communities. Part IV, the recommendations section,
first argues that the existing statutory scheme constitutes a patchwork
characterized by many gaps and shortcomings. To address these
shortcomings, I then develop a proposal for statutory revisions that
will more effectively safeguard the interests of the disadvantaged
during disasters. Only with appropriate planning and resources will
the vulnerable be able to survive and thrive after disasters. Such
preparation is of critical importance based on ethical, legal, and
practical considerations.
I.

VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

Vulnerable populations, also called “special needs” populations31 or
“at-risk” populations,32 are those that are particularly “at risk of poor
30
Distributive justice is concerned with the proper allocation of resources,
benefits, and rewards. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, NOT FAIR!: THE TYPOLOGY OF
COMMONSENSE UNFAIRNESS 23 (2001).
31
FEMA, NRF Resource Center Glossary/Acronyms, http://www.fema.gov/
emergency/nrf/glossary.htm#Top (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (using term “special
needs populations”).
32
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-
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physical, psychological, or social health” after a disaster.33 They have
“additional needs before, during, and after an incident in functional
areas, including but not limited to: maintaining independence,
communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care.”34 The
term “vulnerable” in this Article is thus used to indicate the
Different groups are
dependencies of particular populations.35
traditionally recognized as vulnerable in different contexts.36 During
disasters, several population segments are potentially vulnerable.
These include (1) individuals with physical and mental disabilities, (2)
elderly persons, (3) pregnant women, (4) children, (5) prisoners, (6)
economically disadvantaged minorities, (7) undocumented workers,
and (8) those with language barriers.37 This Part analyzes the
vulnerabilities of each group.
A. Individuals with Disabilities
Large-scale disasters may leave individuals with physical and mental
disabilities particularly challenged and helpless.
Governmental
assistance may be inadequate and may end too quickly after a disaster
to meet the needs of the disabled.38 Individuals with physical
disabilities may be underserved in a variety of ways during a disaster.
For example, those with hearing impairments may not be able to
understand evacuation orders or instructions provided in shelters.39
1(b)(4) (2006) (using term “at-risk individuals”).
33
LU ANN ADAY, AT RISK IN AMERICA: THE HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE NEEDS OF
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2d ed. 2001). Another source
defines “vulnerability” as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation
that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover” from a
disaster. BEN WISNER ET AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S VULNERABILITY AND
DISASTERS 11 (2d ed. 2005).
34
FEMA, supra note 31.
35
See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83
WASH. L. REV. 513, 523-25 (2008) (discussing concept of universal vulnerability and
how it differs from common understanding of vulnerability).
36
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(b), .201-.409 (2008) (establishing additional
protections for research involving fetuses, pregnant women, in vitro fertilization,
prisoners, and children).
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(b)(4)(B) (2006); HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., supra
note 5, at 30-31; Tierney, supra note 5, at 112-20; FEMA, supra note 31; Public Health
— Seattle & King County, supra note 5.
38
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES DURING AND AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: POSITION PAPER AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2006), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/
2006/pdf/peopleneeds.pdf.
39
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 20, at 4.
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To the extent that official communication is transmitted through
visual displays on television broadcasts, television monitors, or on
paper, people with visual impairments might be unable to obtain
critical information.40 Accessible transportation may be unavailable to
evacuate the wheelchair-bound, and shelters may not have accessible
entrances, restrooms, and dining areas or adequate medical care.41 It
is also possible that during triaging processes, some health care
providers may determine that individuals with disabilities are of a
lower priority than others because treating them is more difficult or
complicated. These are not theoretical difficulties. A report by the
National Council on Disability concerning Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita highlights these concerns. It provides accounts of individuals
turned away from shelters, forced to sleep in their wheelchairs, and
housed in inappropriate conditions, where they developed debilitating
After emergencies,
bedsores and other medical problems.42
individuals with disabilities may also find it more difficult to secure
accessible apartments or trailers, health care, appropriate schooling,
and employment in areas that have been devastated by a disaster.43
Those with mental disabilities may also face acute difficulties in
emergencies. Their evacuation may be mismanaged by emergency
responders who misunderstand their behavior or are uncomfortable
with them, and shelters may refuse to accept them or be ill equipped
to meet their needs.44 Individuals with mental disabilities may receive
rough treatment if they are unable to follow instructions45 and be
inappropriately institutionalized as a convenient solution.46 After
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA reportedly refused to provide trailers to
some individuals with known mental health histories even though
they were capable of living independently.47 Some mentally ill
survivors were not able to fill out complicated housing applications
and were not provided adequate assistance.48 In addition, untrained
FEMA officials assessed others as too disabled to live on their own.49
Without appropriate planning that anticipates and accommodates the
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 5.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 15-21.
See id. at 3-4.
See id. at 12.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 38, at 18-20.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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needs of the physically and mentally disabled, these populations are
likely to be underserved in disasters and consequently suffer poor
outcomes.
B. Elderly Persons
Individuals who are sixty-five or older are more likely than others to
suffer from chronic diseases, including arthritis, hypertension, heart
disease, diabetes, and respiratory ailments.50 Eighty percent of adults
in this age group have at least one chronic illness, and fifty percent
have two or more chronic conditions.51 Older adults may also suffer
from mobility, cognitive, sensory, social, and economic limitations
that can impede their adaptability and ability to function in disasters.52
As a result, they may become agitated, overwhelmed, and
traumatized.53
Additionally, during emergencies and in their
aftermaths, the health of older adults can deteriorate because of poor
nutrition, extreme temperatures, exposure to infection, interruptions
in medical treatment, and emotional distress.54 Among individuals
with disabilities, those who are elderly may require particular
attention and support because of their frailties.
C. Pregnant Women
Pregnant women will also have special needs and face increased
risks during disasters.
These include premature deliveries,
underweight infants, and infant mortality.55 Some women may have to
deliver babies without the benefit of hospital care.56 Pregnant women
also run the risk of being evacuated without access to medical records
containing information critical to their welfare or that of their
50

Nancy Aldrich & William F. Benson, Disaster Preparedness and the Chronic
Disease Needs of Vulnerable Older Adults, 5 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 1 (2008),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2008/jan/07_0135.htm.
51
Id. at 2 (“Nearly 50% of adults aged 65 or older have hypertension, 36% have
arthritis, 20% have coronary heart disease, 20% have cancer, 15% have diabetes, and
9% have had a stroke.”).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. (discussing survey of 680 Hurricane Katrina evacuees living in Houston
shelters).
55
Rama Lakshmi, Group Urges Disaster Planning for Pregnant Women, Babies,
WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2006, at A09.
56
KAREN OLNESS ET AL., HOW TO HELP THE CHILDREN IN HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS
123-28 (2d ed. 2006) (describing planning and preparation for women’s obstetrical
needs in disasters).
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fetuses.57 They may lose access to prenatal vitamins or other essential
medication.58 Pandemic outbreaks may be particularly life threatening
for pregnant women or their unborn children, and exposure to other
illnesses, such as viruses, in crowded shelters could constitute a
further hazard. Furthermore, if relief workers are unaware of women’s
pregnancies, they might include them in mass vaccination or other
prophylactic programs contraindicated for pregnant individuals.59
D. Children
Children are a vulnerable population because of their susceptibility
to injury and their dependence on others for livelihood, decision
making, and emotional support.60 Studies have shown that children
who are injured by explosions are at greater risk of significant trauma
than are adults.61 Children may also suffer greater harm from
exposure to bioterrorism agents because of their size, metabolisms,
respiratory rates, and other factors.62 Moreover, the physiological
differences between children and adults are numerous, relating to
head and tongue size in proportion to other body parts, nerve
conduction, ventilation, oxygen demand, circulating blood flow,
vulnerability of the liver and spleen, and skin thickness.63 Children
are likely to develop dehydration, malnutrition, and exhaustion more
quickly than adults, and they are more susceptible to infectious
57
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Critical Needs in Caring for
Pregnant Women During Times of Disaster for Non-Obstetric Health Care Providers,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/pregnantdisasterhcp.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
58
Id.
59
William M. Callaghan et al., Health Concerns of Women and Infants in Times of
Natural Disasters: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina, 11 MATERNAL CHILD
HEALTH J. 307, 307, 310 (2007) (discussing adverse impact on pregnancy of exposure
to toxins, stress, and limited access to health care and risks of certain vaccinations);
Bonnie Ewing et al., Assisting Pregnant Women to Prepare for Disaster, 33 AM. J.
MATERNAL CHILD NURSING 98, 99 (2008) (“Pregnant women are a vulnerable
population at high risk for injury, illness, and death before, during, and after
disasters.”); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 57.
60
See INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 223 (“Children react differently than adults
to medical emergencies because of anatomical, physiological, developmental, and
emotional differences. Because of these differences, children are among the most
vulnerable individuals in the event of a disaster.”).
61
Diana G. Fendya, When Disaster Strikes — Care Considerations for Pediatric
Patients, 13 J. TRAUMA NURSING 161, 161 (2006).
62
Shelly D. Martin et al., A National Survey of Terrorism Preparedness Training
Among Pediatric, Family Practice, and Emergency Medicine Programs, 118 PEDIATRICS
e620, e625 (2006), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/118/3/e620.
63
Fendya, supra note 61, at 163-64.
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diseases and severe forms of illnesses than are older individuals.64 All
of these factors affect children’s treatment needs and medical
outcomes. In addition, caring for children in an emergency involves
psychological and social challenges stemming from their level of
cognitive ability, emotional vulnerability, and dependence upon the
support of family members.65
Thus, treatment that would be adequate for adults might be
negligent or even grossly negligent66 if administered to children. For
example, children need different medication dosages and medical
equipment sizes than adults, and the water pressure used to
decontaminate67 older people who are exposed to chemical releases is
inappropriate for young children.68 According to one study, fewer
than fifty percent of emergency medicine programs that responded to
a terrorism preparedness survey reported having adequate training
relating to child victims.69 In addition, there are comparatively few
pediatric hospital beds, pediatric specialists, or providers with
expertise in caring for children.70
Children require special attention and procedures during disasters,
and they are often identified as a population that should be prioritized
during relief efforts. For example, a government guidance document
concerning the allocation of pandemic influenza vaccines reported
that an essential priority of vaccine programs should be to protect
children.71 Yet, despite these initiatives, many agree that those

64

OLNESS ET AL., supra note 56, at 35.
Fendya, supra note 61, at 164-65.
66
Gross negligence is “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another.”
Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. 1988);
Karen J. Kruger, Governmental Immunity in Maryland: A Practitioner’s Guide to Making
and Defending Tort Claims, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 53 (2007) (discussing high standard
for proving gross negligence).
67
To decontaminate is to free of harmful substances, such as hazardous
chemicals. WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 293 (3d ed. 2004).
68
Fendya, supra note 61, at 162.
69
Martin et al., supra note 62, at e620.
70
INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 235 (“In the event of a disaster, the capacity of
the health care system to care for a large number of children is likely to be
inadequate.”).
71
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
GUIDANCE ON ALLOCATING AND TARGETING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE 2-3, 13
(2008), available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/vaccine/allocationguidance.pdf.
Others who were identified as deserving priority were key pandemic responders and
health care providers, those maintaining “essential community services,” and
individuals at greatest risk of infection because of their work. Id. at 3.
65
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involved in the process of public health emergency planning have too
often overlooked the needs of pediatric patients.72
E. Prisoners
Because they are in custody, prisoners are entirely dependent upon
governmental authorities for their welfare during a disaster, and,
therefore, they too are a vulnerable population. Prisoners cannot
evacuate on their own, seek medical care, or obtain food, shelter, and
supplies unless authorities provide these to them.73 Furthermore, in
the chaos of an emergency, inmates could be subject to attacks by
fellow prisoners or poorly trained, panicked guards.74
Events in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrate just how
vulnerable prisoners are during disasters. The American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) issued a 2006 report entitled Abandoned and
Abused, which describes the shocking conditions prisoners in the
Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”) faced during and after Hurricane
Katrina.75 The following excerpt from the ACLU report vividly
illustrates the dangers prisoners can face during a disaster:
As floodwaters rose in the OPP Buildings, power was lost, and
entire buildings were plunged into darkness. Deputies left
their posts wholesale, leaving behind prisoners in locked cells,
some standing in sewage-tainted water up to their chests.
Over the next few days, without food, water, or ventilation,
prisoners broke windows in order to get air, and carved holes
in the jail’s walls in an effort to get to safety. . . . Once freed
from the buildings, prisoners were bused to receiving facilities
around the state, . . . [though at one correctional center]
thousands of OPP evacuees spent several days on a large
outdoor field, where prisoner-on-prisoner violence was
rampant and went unchecked by correctional officers.76
This episode demonstrates the manifest need for a systematic
approach to disaster relief for prisoners. While many if not most state
departments of corrections have emergency preparation systems or

72

INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 226, 229; Fendya, supra note 61, at 161.
See Ira P. Robbins, Lessons from Hurricane Katrina: Prison Emergency
Preparedness as a Constitutional Imperative, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 3-4 (2008).
74
Id.
75
See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ABANDONED AND ABUSED (2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf.
76
Id. at 9.
73
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plans,77 commentators have criticized these as inadequate.78 In
particular, the plans have been found to be lacking in the areas of
emergency training, drills and exercises, and preparation for possible
terrorist attacks.79
F.

Economically Disadvantaged Minorities, Undocumented Workers,
and Individuals with Language Barriers

Economically and socially disadvantaged individuals are likely to
suffer disproportionate harm from disasters because they lack
resources and adequate support systems.80 Two disasters within the
past two decades illustrate the problems facing those with
socioeconomic disadvantages. In 1995, over 700 people died during a
weeklong heat wave in Chicago.81 African Americans were one-and-ahalf times more likely to die than whites because they were
impoverished, segregated, and lacked “social capital.”82 Ten years
later, during Hurricane Katrina, the majority of those who remained in
New Orleans were African Americans, and 21,787 black households
reportedly had no car with which to evacuate the city.83
Communication barriers compounded their problems, as residents
who followed television broadcasts received untimely and
contradictory evacuation instructions from authorities.84 In addition,
African-American refugees were not always welcomed by other
communities.85 At one point, a large group of mostly black refugees

77

JEFFREY A. SCHWARTZ & CYNTHIA BARRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO
PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO PRISON EMERGENCIES 185-98 (2005), available at
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2005/020293.pdf (reporting on survey to which 33 state
departments of correction responded and estimating that 70 to 85 percent of
departments have emergency preparedness systems in place).
78
Robbins, supra note 73, at 14.
79
Id. at 13-20.
80
Daniel Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW & INEQ. 297, 302 (2007);
Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, Note, No New Orleanians Left Behind: An Examination
of the Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Minorities, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1153, 1161
(2006).
81
Farber, supra note 80, at 304-05.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 297-98, 302.
84
Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1269; Keith Elder et al., African Americans’
Decisions Not To Evacuate New Orleans Before Hurricane Katrina: A Qualitative Study,
97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S124, S126 (2007).
85
Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 1168-72 (discussing role of racism in Katrina
response, including “false reports of violence and the subsequent strong-armed
reaction”).
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attempted to walk across a bridge to Gretna, Louisiana, but were
stopped by armed police because the City of Gretna did not wish to
In addition, economically
allow their entry or help them.86
disadvantaged individuals are less likely than wealthier people to own
residences and to benefit from insurance proceeds and other assistance
available to homeowners after a disaster.87 Lack of medical insurance
may also impede the recovery of those who have suffered health
consequences because of an emergency.88
Another group of vulnerable individuals, migrant workers, might be
lured to areas that have been devastated by a catastrophe, hoping to
find long-term, lucrative work assignments during the rebuilding
process.89 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, thousands of
workers, many of whom were undocumented, moved to New
Orleans.90 However, employers often housed individuals in deplorable
conditions, required them to do extremely hazardous work, and
denied them the pay they were promised.91 In addition, post-Katrina
workers, like 9/11 responders, faced significant health risks and were
not provided appropriate training or protective gear.92
Undocumented individuals who are themselves victims of a disaster
are eligible for short-term assistance after an emergency but, because
of their illegal status, they are not qualified for long-term shelter or

86

Farber, supra note 80, at 303; Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 1171. Sixty-two
percent of those who died in New Orleans were African American. SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR & RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA,
109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
115 (2006), available at http://katrina.house.gov. However, African Americans appear
not to have suffered a disproportionate number of deaths, as 68 percent of New
Orleans’ population was black in 2005. See Census Says New Orleans Is Still a
“Chocolate” Metropolis, THE LA. WEEKLY, Aug. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/news.php?viewStory=257.
87
Farber, supra note 80, at 305.
88
In 2007, 45.7 million Americans were uninsured. See Press Release, U.S.
Census Bureau, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rates Unchanged, Number of
Uninsured Down (Aug. 26, 2008) (http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/income_wealth/012528.html).
89
Haley E. Olam & Erin S. Stamper, Note, The Suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act
and the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 24 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 145, 145 (2006).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 163-65.
92
Id. at 167-68.
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food programs.93 Many may hesitate to turn to authorities for any aid
at all because they fear prosecution for immigration violations.94
Finally, people with limited or nonexistent English language skills,
who may or may not be otherwise disadvantaged, could face
difficulties because they do not understand government-issued
communications. Even efforts to translate communications might fail
if translators do not pay careful attention to the nuances of language
and to words, phrases, and concepts that cannot faithfully be
translated from English to other languages.95 Furthermore, efforts to
distribute information to minorities through the Internet will be
ineffective for those without computer access or sophisticated
computer skills.96
As this Part has made clear, there are many populations whose
dependencies make them vulnerable to disproportionate harm during
disasters. But should society devote resources to protect these
vulnerable groups during emergencies? The next Part explores
normative responses to this question.
II.

NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS

Emergency preparedness for vulnerable populations raises
challenging ethical questions. In the midst of a disaster, how should
limited resources be allocated? To what extent should the needs of
vulnerable populations be prioritized? For example, if health care
providers are overwhelmed by a demand for medical care, should
patients be treated simply on a first-come, first-served basis? Should
patients be selected for treatment based on their anticipated
prognosis? Should patients’ social worth be considered in resource
allocation decisions? Even the most prominent ethicists acknowledge
that these problems are unresolved and have no easy solutions.97
The intractability of these questions has not prevented scholars and
philosophers from proffering answers. This Part briefly explores
several approaches to distributive justice, including utilitarianism,
93
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, WHEN
DISASTER STRIKES: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 GULF COAST HURRICANES 2526 (2006), available at http://humanrights.vcop.edu/berkeley/disaster_strikes_
version2.pdf.
94
Id. at 26.
95
Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1272.
96
Id. (finding that “most resources and materials targeting minorities are
disseminated primarily through the Internet”).
97
Norman Daniels, Four Unsolved Rationing Problems: A Challenge, 24 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 27, 27 (1994).

1508

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:1491

equal chances, and the best outcome for the least well off.98 The
purpose of this Part is not to develop a definitive answer to the
complex ethical question of whether the disadvantaged should receive
priority or disproportionate resources in the midst of a disaster and
extreme scarcity. Rather, this Part shows that the difficulty in
determining how to allocate scarce resources during disasters
necessitates advanced planning. Planning before catastrophic events
have struck will diminish the need for government agencies to make
difficult moral choices in the midst of emergencies.
A. Utilitarianism
According to utilitarian principles, actions are appropriate if they
produce the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of
people.99 Actions need not have similar or identical consequences for
all impacted individuals; rather, they must achieve the maximum
overall benefit.100 In the context of triage, the principle of utility
might translate into a policy of attempting to save the greatest number
of lives and thus to direct treatment to those who are most likely to
benefit from it.101 For example, health care providers may withhold
medical resources from individuals considered unlikely to benefit
98

See supra note 30.
J.J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 30, 47
(1973) (explaining that under utilitarianism action A is to be chosen over action B if
doing A will make mankind happier than doing B and if probable benefit will be
maximized); John C. Moskop & Kenneth V. Iserson, Triage in Medicine, Part II:
Underlying Values and Principles, 49 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 282, 284 (2007).
100
See sources cited supra note 99.
101
See GERALD R. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 63-70 (1982). The author outlines
five “ranking principles for triage”:
99

U-1. The principle of medical success. Priority given to those for whom
treatment has the highest probability of medical success.
U-2. The principle of immediate usefulness. Priority given to the most
useful under the immediate circumstances.
U-3. The principle of conservation. Priority given to those who require
proportionately smaller amounts of the resources.
U-4. The principle of parental role. Priority given to those who have the
largest responsibilities to dependents.
U-5. The principle of general social value. Priority given to those believed
to have the greatest general social worth.
Id. at 105-06; Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 283; Nicki Pesik et al., Terrorism and
the Ethics of Emergency Medical Care, 37 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 642, 644 (2001).
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significantly from care.
Such individuals include those with
complicating factors or circumstances that prevent people from
thriving, complying with medical protocols, or caring for themselves
after treatment, such as multiple illnesses, drug or alcohol abuse,
homelessness, or social or behavioral problems.102 Furthermore,
providers might deny care to injured patients who require
considerable resources because of underlying infirmities or disabilities
in order to save multiple patients who are healthier and require less
treatment.103 Utilitarian principles might militate against prioritizing
care for the disadvantaged in an emergency if such individuals would
require a disproportionate amount of resources.
Not all philosophers embrace utilitarianism principles. Some
commentators criticize utilitarianism on at least three grounds.104
First, utilitarianism may lead to results that defy moral and ethical
values. For example, at its extremes, utilitarianism might lead one to
justify killing a single individual in order to transplant her organs in
others, saving multiple lives.105 Second, it can be difficult to predict
who will actually benefit most from treatment and who will live the
most valuable lives posttreatment.106 Third, even assuming the ability
to predict these subsequent developments, utilitarianism requires
unpalatable assumptions about the value of one life over another. For
example, is the life of a quadriplegic patient less worth saving than the
life of a nondisabled person? How can we assume that the
quadriplegic individual does not derive as much pleasure from living,
has a shorter life expectancy, or cannot contribute as much to society
as others? What if the quadriplegic individual is Stephen Hawking?
By contrast, what if the able-bodied person who is saved instead of the
quadriplegic is a reckless driver prone to causing life-threatening
accidents? Thus, utilitarianism can raise as many questions about
distributive justice as it answers.

102
Asha V. Devereaux et al., Definitive Care for the Critically Ill During a Disaster:
A Framework for Allocation of Scarce Resources in Mass Critical Care: Tbl. 6, 133 CHEST
J. 51S, 60S (2008) (describing exclusion criteria for triage purposes); Moskop &
Iserson, supra note 99, at 283; Pesik et al., supra note 101, at 644-45.
103
Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285.
104
See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 67-73, 77-150 (critiquing
utilitarianism).
105
Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285.
106
Id. at 284 (“A standard criticism of utilitarianism is that it is often very difficult
to predict the consequences of one’s actions accurately.”).
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B. Equal Chances
A second approach to distributive justice is the principle of equal
chances. This principle requires health care providers to give each
individual an equal chance to survive on the theory that each person’s
life is equally valuable to him or her.107 This approach rejects the
utilitarian argument that decision makers should calculate the sum of
all anticipated benefits and burdens at issue in making treatment
determinations.108
The philosopher John Taurek presented the following example to
illustrate the theory of equal chances:
I have a supply of some life-saving drug. Six people will all
certainly die if they are not treated with the drug. But one of
the six requires all of the drug if he is to survive. Each of the
other five requires only one-fifth of the drug. What ought I to
do?109
Taurek concludes that he should give each person an equal chance
to survive and flip a coin to decide whether to give the drug to the one
person who needs all of it or to the five who need only a fraction of
the available amount.110
The individual requiring all of the
medication, like the other five, would have a fifty-fifty likelihood of
being saved.111 For purposes of establishing a disaster triaging policy,
Taurek’s philosophy would require a first-come, first-served process
by which all treatable patients who arrive while resources are available
would be given identical priority regardless of whether they need very
intensive care or much more limited treatment.112 In the alternative, a
lottery system could be established.113
Critics of Taurek’s philosophy argue that allowing many to perish in
order to save the few is irrational. For example, in an essay entitled
Why the Numbers Should Sometimes Count, John Saunders presents a
hypothetical in which there is a choice between saving a single life and
saving ten billion lives.114 Saunders asks whether even in these
107

Id. at 286.
Id.
109
John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293, 294 (1977).
110
Id. at 303.
111
Id.
112
WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 98-101 (discussing principle of prioritizing those
who arrive first); Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 286.
113
WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 101-05 (discussing random selection for triaging
purposes).
114
John T. Saunders, Why the Numbers Should Sometimes Count, 17 PHIL. & PUB.
108
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circumstances, Taurek would give the same priority to the single
individual as to the ten billion. He argues that if human beings are
valuable as human beings, it is only right to attempt to save as many of
them as possible and to “count the numbers.”115
Still, the equal chances principle raises thought-provoking questions
as to whether, in the face of scarce resources, the default rule should
be to try to save the many and sacrifice the few who need the most
care. Do decision makers have a right to establish priorities based on
value judgments concerning the worth of human lives? Those who
are denied care likely have a fierce will to live and see their lives as
immeasurably valuable. Thus, they will suffer intensely from the
knowledge that they have been doomed to die while others are saved.
The equal chances theory does not support prioritizing the
vulnerable over other disaster victims. Rather, it establishes an ethical
nondiscrimination mandate that forbids deeming the disadvantaged to
be less eligible for rescue based on the medical, social, or economic
resources that they may require during and after disasters.
C. The Best Outcome for the Least Well Off
A third normative argument, the theory of “the best outcome for the
least well off,” supports prioritizing the needs of vulnerable
populations over others. Disadvantaged members of society will likely
suffer disproportionate harm in disasters because of poverty,
disabilities, isolation, and lack of resources with which to survive and
recover.116 According to this theory, authorities should distribute
limited resources unequally in order to maximize benefits for the least
well off.117 Consequently, the least advantaged members of society
would receive maximum benefits so that death — the worst outcome
and the one most likely to be suffered by the disadvantaged — is
avoided if at all possible.118
John Rawls articulates the rationale behind this approach in A
Theory of Justice.119 Rawls outlines the principles of justice that
AFF. 3, 3-4 (1988).
115
Id. at 13.
116
Farber, supra note 80, at 321 (“[T]he social disadvantages our society treats as
ordinary and unremarkable become deadly in dramatic ways during the course of a
disaster.”).
117
WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 92-98 (discussing approaches of prioritizing
medically neediest and those who are generally neediest and most helpless); Moskop
& Iserson, supra note 99, at 285.
118
Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285.
119
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
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hypothetical decision makers would choose were they operating
behind a “veil of ignorance.”120 These decision makers would not
know their own specific circumstances in life, such as their social
status, personal strengths, and weaknesses.
Consequently, the
decision makers would not be prejudiced by their own agendas and
expectations in life.121 Rawls argues that the veil of ignorance would
promote procedural justice and would prevent decision makers from
exploiting people’s diverse social and personal circumstances for their
own advantage.122 Rawls further hypothesizes that these decision
makers would wish to maximize benefits for the worst off in the hope
of ensuring their own good outcomes if they themselves were to fare
poorly one day.123 Thus, Rawls posits a “difference principle,”124
according to which unequal distribution of wealth and income is
permissible only if it is to the advantage of those who are least
fortunate.125
Emergencies involving illness and injuries, however, may
complicate this approach. The worst off will presumably be the
sickest, and their risk of death will be highest. Thus, it is arguably
irrational to plan to expend sizeable medical resources on what may
well be futile attempts to save them.126 Nevertheless, the argument
that the government should redistribute resources to maximize
benefits for the least advantaged is useful in that it emphasizes that
some members of society may have greater resources and support
networks with which to help themselves during emergencies than
others. Thus, in the face of scarcity, officials may be justified in
prioritizing the needs of those who are socially, economically, or
medically vulnerable because these individuals could suffer
particularly acute and long-lasting harm. As one commentator asserts,
“Social justice. . . requires action to preserve human dignity for all,
particularly those who suffer from systematic disadvantage.”127

120

Id. at 118-23.
Id. at 118.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 132-33; WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 51-52.
124
RAWLS, supra note 119, at 65-70.
125
Id. at 68-70, 175.
126
Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285.
127
Lawrence O. Gostin, Why Should We Care About Social Justice?, 37 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 3, 3 (2007).
121
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D. What Ethics Teaches Us
Utilitarianism, equal chances, and the best outcome for the least
well off constitute three distinct approaches to distributive justice.
These ethical theories provide no clear, single answer to the question
of how emergency planners and responders should prioritize the needs
of various populations and to whom resources should be allocated in
the face of scarcity. Because there are no clear answers to these
complex moral questions, the optimal approach is to minimize the
need for difficult ethical choices, as I argue below.
The utilitarian goal of maximizing the net benefit to society may be
intuitively appealing, especially in the context of disasters.128
However, alternative conceptions of distributive justice also exist.
These promote egalitarianism129 or emphasize the needs of the
disadvantaged.130
Many commentators argue vigorously that
considerable resources should be invested in assisting vulnerable
individuals such as the poor, institutionalized, and disabled, because
they are the least able to withstand the hardships caused by
catastrophic events.131
Even some proponents of a utilitarian approach find it unethical to
consider certain vulnerabilities as factors that influence resource
allocation, and thus they offer a hybrid form of utilitarianism. For
example, one article categorizes the following considerations as
permissible for purposes of making emergency treatment decisions
when faced with scarce resources: likelihood, duration, and extent of
benefit as well as urgency of need and amount of required resources.132
128
See RAWLS, supra note 119, at 20 (describing classical utilitarianism as teaching
that “society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the
individuals belonging to it”); Robert Baker & Martin Strosberg, Triage and Equality:
An Historical Reassessment of Utilitarian Analyses of Triage, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
103, 106 (1992).
129
See Baker & Strosberg, supra note 128, at 105 (discussing egalitarianism); supra
Part II.B. (discussing equal chances theory). Egalitarianism means treating all
members of society equally. See Baker & Strosberg, supra note 128, at 105.
130
See supra Part II.C.
131
See JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 3 (2007) (reporting on
convergence of views that ideal policy is to “identify the worst off and take
appropriate steps so that their position can be improved”); Gostin, supra note 127, at 3
(asserting that “[s]ocial justice demands more than fair distribution of benefits and
burdens in extreme health emergencies” and that failure to adequately support
disadvantaged will “undermine[] social cohesion”); Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6,
at 33 (emphasizing that pandemic is likely to “exacerbate existing social and economic
inequalities” and is thus “an urgent matter of social justice”); supra Part II.C.
132
Pesik et al., supra note 101, at 644.
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However, the authors warn that the following factors should not be
deemed relevant: “[a]ge, ethnicity, or sex”; “[t]alents, abilities,
disabilities, or deformities”; “[s]ocioeconomic status, social worth, or
political position”; “[c]oexistent conditions that do not affect shortterm prognosis”; “[d]rug or alcohol abuse”; and “[a]ntisocial or
aggressive behaviors.”133 Accordingly, decision makers pursuing the
goal of maximizing the net benefit to society would focus on shortterm outcomes, prioritizing based on resources, need, and benefit
considerations but not based on value judgments concerning who is
deserving of care or who will live the most valuable lives in the future.
A careful study of American law reveals many instances in which we
reject the utilitarian approach. American society has already elected to
expend disproportionate resources on assisting the disadvantaged, and
thus it is evident that doing so is politically feasible. For example, a
large percentage of health care spending occurs at the end of life, often
out of the publicly funded Medicare program, when there is little hope
of longevity or a long-term high quality of life.134 Likewise,
Medicaid135 and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(“SCHIP”)136 provide health benefits for the impoverished at public
expense, while other Americans must pay out of pocket for insurance
policies or remain uninsured.137 The Americans with Disabilities
Act138 requires reasonable accommodations for individuals with
disabilities, even when these impose expenditures upon private

133

Id.
See Micah Hartman et al., U.S. Health Spending by Age, Selected Years Through
2004, 27 HEALTH AFF. w1, w2 (2007) (stating that per capita spending for those age 85
and older was 5.7 percent higher than spending by working-age individuals in 2004);
Christopher Hogan et al., Medicare Beneficiaries’ Costs of Care in the Last Year of Life,
20 HEALTH AFF. 188, 190 (2001) (reporting that “spending in the last year of life
accounted for 27.4% of all Medicare outlays for the elderly”); Donald R. Hoover et al.,
Medical Expenditures During the Last Year of Life: Findings From the 1992-1996
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, 37 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1625, 1631, 1634 (2002)
(finding that average annual medical expenditures for Medicare patients’ last year of
life was $37,581 in 1996 dollars, compared to $7,365 for nonterminal years).
135
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid Program — General
Information, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
136
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Low Cost Health Insurance for
Families and Children Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/LowCostHealthInsFam
Child/05OriginalSCHIPStatePlan.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
137
Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987)
(explaining that there is “no general right, based upon either the Constitution or
federal statutes, to the provision of medical treatment and services by a state or
municipality”).
138
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
134
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businesses.139 Similarly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”)140 requires public schools to provide special education
services to children with certain mental and physical disabilities, even
though special services are not legally mandated for others, such as
gifted students.141 These examples illustrate a profound commitment
to the vulnerable.
Nevertheless, this Article does not attempt to resolve the challenging
normative question of whether, in the face of extreme scarcity during
an emergency, resources should be allocated disproportionately to the
vulnerable while others are allowed to suffer greater deprivation as a
result. Rather, I argue that society should focus significant attention
on vulnerable populations during emergency planning processes,
when planners have the leisure of acting without the pressures of time,
chaotic conditions, and an extreme dearth of resources.142
Many complicated ethical decisions could in fact be avoided with
appropriate emergency response preparation. Response and recovery
plans must include provisions to meet the needs of a wide spectrum of
vulnerable groups. An essential goal of emergency planning efforts
should be to minimize unanticipated and complicated resource
allocation problems involving the disadvantaged and vulnerable.143
Moreover, disaster readiness for the general population and disaster
readiness for the vulnerable are mutually beneficial goals. The best
outcomes for the vulnerable are most likely to be achieved with
optimal preparation for those without special needs. The more
prepared and well equipped the general population is to react
appropriately during emergencies and the more the healthy and strong
can care for themselves, the more likely it is that resources will be
available for the acute needs of the disadvantaged. Advance planning
and preparedness initiatives for all populations should aim to curtail
the need for difficult moral choices and for sacrificing some victims for
the sake of others.
139

See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); infra text accompanying note 197.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2006)
(originally enacted as Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230,
tit. VI, 84 Stat. 175 (1971)).
141
Id.§ 1400 (setting forth findings and purposes section); id. § 1411 (authorizing
appropriation for purposes of providing special education to children with
disabilities); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2008) (establishing requirement for free
appropriate public education for children with disabilities).
142
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that federal government
has invested over $10 billion in emergency preparedness initiatives since 2001).
143
See infra Part IV (detailing recommendations designed to promote achievement
of this goal).
140
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III. THE LAW AND VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
The U.S. Constitution, federal law, and state statutes establish
numerous obligations to protect vulnerable groups. Several of these are
emergency response laws that specifically address disaster response and
preparedness for the disadvantaged. Emergency relief planners and
responders must recognize and be guided by these mandates. This Part
focuses on a variety of general and disaster-specific federal and state
provisions that establish nondiscrimination directives and affirmative
duties to accommodate the needs of particular at-risk groups.
A. General Legal Protections for the Vulnerable
Many legal provisions establish general protections for a variety of
vulnerable groups. These protections apply both in ordinary times
and in disasters. Below I analyze federal constitutional and statutory
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. I also analyze state constitutional and statutory laws and tort
theory, all of which generally protect the vulnerable.
1.

Federal Protections

Federal protections for the disadvantaged flow from both
constitutional provisions and federal statutes. I analyze the content
and efficacy of these safeguards below, turning first to constitutional
law and then to statutory law.
a.

Constitutional Provisions

The Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment are the
principal sources of constitutional protection for the vulnerable.
While plaintiffs have asserted many claims based on these
Amendments, constitutional jurisprudence establishes significant
obstacles to successful litigation.
Despite these obstacles,
constitutional mandates serve as an important guide for emergency
planners and responders.
(1) The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”144 The
Supreme Court has ruled that the equal protection mandate applies to
both state and federal governmental entities.145 This mandate in
principle prohibits group-based discrimination by the government.146
The Equal Protection Clause most clearly prohibits race-based
discrimination by the government. During the 1970s and 1980s,
minority communities brought several successful federal equal
protection challenges against municipalities based upon inequitable
distribution of public services. In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,147 the
plaintiffs alleged that African Americans occupied nearly ninety-eight
percent of homes adjacent to unpaved streets in the town; that ninetyseven percent of homes without sanitary sewer service were in
African-American neighborhoods; and that all new mercury vapor
street lighting fixtures were installed in white neighborhoods.148 Based
on these facts, the Fifth Circuit found that the town had violated the
Equal Protection Clause by providing plaintiffs with inferior
governmental services.149 Similarly, in Ammons v. Dade City, Florida,150
the Eleventh Circuit held that the City’s intentional discrimination in
the provision of street paving, resurfacing, maintenance, and storm
water drainage facilities to black and white communities constituted
an equal protection violation.151 These precedents demonstrate that
plaintiffs can assert successful equal protection claims in cases of
serious, intentional governmental discrimination. Thus, if authorities
deliberately underserve or mistreat a minority community, such as
African Americans, during an emergency because of race, that group
could have a valid equal protection claim.
Liability for violations of the Equal Protection Clause is not limited
to governmental agencies. State officials can be sued in their
individual capacities for violating constitutional and civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.152 That section provides that “[e]very person who,
144
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
145
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
146
Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality,
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2422 (2003) (“Race discrimination is the
archetype of the group-based discriminations that the Equal Protection Clause was
enacted to forbid.”).
147
437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
148
Id. at 1288.
149
Id.
150
783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986).
151
Id. at 983-84.
152
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation . . . of any
State . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured.”153 The Supreme Court has held that §
1983 applies to federal officials as well.154
However, litigants asserting constitutional violations face significant
challenges. First, state and federal entities and their employees often
enjoy immunity protection. The Eleventh Amendment provides that
private citizens cannot sue states for damages in federal court.155 This
principle extends to constitutional claims in state court156 and to
agencies and other arms of the state.157 All suits for damages or
retroactive relief against state governments are barred by the
Amendment unless they are brought by a state or the federal
government,158 though Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
extend to local government entities.159 Likewise, the doctrine of
federal sovereign immunity protects the United States from being sued
without its consent.160
Furthermore, the defense of qualified
immunity shields federal and state government officials who are
performing discretionary functions in their official capacities from
liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”161 Immunity and qualified immunity thus
constitute significant barriers to recovery for constitutional claims.
153

Id.
See Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1970) (allowing for
damages to redress Fourth Amendment violations by federal officials).
155
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The text reads as follows: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
156
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that “the powers delegated
to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power
to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts”).
157
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 985 (5th ed. 2003).
158
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (6th ed. 2000);
see Alden, 527 U.S. 754; Carlos Manuel Vazquesz, What Is Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685-86 (1997).
159
Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
160
FALLON ET AL., supra note 157, at 1001.
161
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that “[w]hether an official may prevail in his
qualified immunity defense depends upon the objective reasonableness of [his]
154
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In addition, plaintiffs must assert intentional discrimination rather
than disparate impact. Policies or actions that have only a disparate
impact on a particular group do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.162
Finally, courts do not analyze all unequal treatment cases in the same
manner under constitutional standards. Governmental classifications
based on race, national origin, or alienage are subject to strict scrutiny
by the courts.163 All other types of classifications receive lower levels of
review. For example, courts review sex-based differential treatment
under intermediate scrutiny.164 And classifications based on age and
disability are subject to “rational basis” review — the government must
show only that such classifications constitute “rational means to serve a
legitimate end.”165 Plaintiffs asserting claims that will be assessed
under the rational basis standard thus face particularly significant
obstacles to successful litigation.
Still, while litigants may have difficulty prevailing in damages suits
against governmental entities and employees, the Hawkins and
Ammons cases166 demonstrate that plaintiff victories are possible.
Furthermore, regardless of potential litigation outcomes, the Equal
Protection Clause articulates a clear antidiscrimination principle that
should guide governmental authorities, including those charged with
emergency preparedness and response.
(2) The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishment[]”167 and governs the treatment of incarcerated
individuals.168 While the general population has no right to health
care or to have other services provided by the government,169 prisoners
conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law”).
162
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact.”).
163
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
164
Id. at 441.
165
Id. at 441-42 (applying rational basis review to invalidate requirement of
special-use permit for group home for mentally retarded individuals).
166
See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
167
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
168
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976).
169
Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987)
(explaining that there is “no general right, based upon either the Constitution or
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are entitled to food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment because
they are not free to obtain these necessities for themselves.170 These
entitlements are not suspended during disasters. As the Supreme
Court has explained:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive
limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment . . . .171
The Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”172
Like those subject to equal protection violations, prisoners who feel
they are the victims of cruel and unusual punishment may bring
constitutional claims. Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners may
challenge their treatment in two ways. First, they may challenge
specific conduct by prison officials, and second, they may challenge
prison policies or regulations. Neither is easy to accomplish.
Prisoners aggrieved by specific conduct must show that the conditions
of incarceration posed substantial risks of serious harm and that
prison officials demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to their health
or safety.173 Inmates must establish that prison officials were aware of
and understood the risk at issue and disregarded it.174 A showing of
“deliberate indifference” requires more than evidence of negligence
but less than proof of acts or omissions intended to cause harm or
perpetrated with knowledge that harm would result.175
Likewise, claims based on allegedly unconstitutional prison policies
face significant hurdles. Even if policies infringe upon prisoners’
constitutional rights, courts will uphold them so long as they are
reasonably related to the government’s legitimate penological
interests.176 Despite this obstacle, inmates have prevailed in several
federal statutes, to the provision of medical treatment and services by a state or
municipality”).
170
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
171
Id.
172
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
173
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
174
Id. at 837.
175
Id. at 835.
176
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (involving challenges to regulation
concerning inmate-to-inmate correspondence, which was upheld, and inmate
marriage regulation, which was not).
In order to analyze a regulation’s
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cases challenging prison policies. For example, in Tillery v. Owen,177
the Third Circuit found that prison conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment when prisoners were double-celled in “an overcrowded,
dilapidated and unsanitary” facility.178 Similarly, in French v. Owens,179
the plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to overcrowding and
mechanical restraints; that they received inadequate health care, food,
and recreation; and that the prison had an insufficient number of
safety personnel and failed to comply with fire and occupational safety
regulations.180 The Seventh Circuit found that many of these
conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment that was
unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment.181
In the context of emergency preparedness, the failure to develop and
execute emergency plans may constitute an Eighth Amendment
violation. Concededly, ordinary negligence by prison authorities is
not a constitutional violation, and most prison regulations are upheld
as sufficiently linked to valid penological goals.182 But if prison
authorities do not have or do not follow established emergency plans
and abandon prisons en masse, leaving inmates to fend for themselves,
as happened after Hurricane Katrina, an Eighth Amendment violation
reasonableness, a court must consider the following four factors:
(1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) the
court should determine whether there are alternative means of exercising the
constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (3) the court is to
consider the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources; and (4) the court should assess whether there are ready
alternatives to the prison regulation; the absence of such ready alternatives
suggests that the regulation is reasonable while their existence may be
evidence of the opposite.
Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Safley, 482 U.S. at 8991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
177
907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990).
178
Id. at 420.
179
777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985).
180
Id. at 1251.
181
See id. at 1258 (affirming district court’s judgment for plaintiffs based on
overcrowding, double-celling, mechanical restraints, and inadequate medical care,
kitchen services, and correction officers, and vacating and remanding lower-court
judgment insofar as it addressed exercise, recreation, protective custody, and fire and
occupational safety); see also McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1991)
(finding that inmate’s Eight Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to
live in sewage and filthy water).
182
See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
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may exist. Similarly, if prison authorities implement irrational policies
that have no penological goals and endanger prisoners’ lives during an
emergency, courts may find them liable for constitutional violations.183
b.

Statutory Protections

Several federal statutes establish antidiscrimination mandates that
apply to emergency planning and response activities. These laws,
which prohibit discrimination based on disability, race, color, and
national origin, include the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, all of
which are analyzed below.
(1) The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits disabilitybased discrimination.184 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008185
clarified the definition of “disability” and instructed that the term be
interpreted in a broad and inclusive manner.186 The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973187 provides further protections to the disabled. Together,
these acts forbid public and private entities from discriminating
against those with disabilities. Moreover, these acts reflect a legislative
determination that society should not only eschew discrimination but
also furnish accommodations for the needs of the disabled.
The ADA features separate titles that address discrimination by
governmental entities and private businesses. Title II of the ADA
governs the conduct of public services.188 Qualified individuals with
disabilities189 may not be denied the benefits of programs, activities,
and services, such as public transportation, provided by public

183

See Robbins, supra note 73, at 20-40 (arguing that Eighth Amendment provides
prisoners with plausible mechanism by which to challenge mistreatment such as that
suffered during and after Hurricane Katrina).
184
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
185
Pub. L. No.110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 705, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-103, 12111-114, 12201, 12205a-213).
186
42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4) (2008) (“The definition of disability in this Act shall be
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum
extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”).
187
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
188
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-165 (2000).
189
In the Title II context, qualified individuals are those “who, with or without
reasonable modifications . . . meet[] the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity.” Id. § 12131.
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entities, nor can they be subjected to discrimination by these entities
because of their disabilities.190 Title II requires public entities to make
their services readily accessible to individuals with disabilities unless
the actions required to achieve this goal would “result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity
or in undue financial and administrative burdens.”191 Finally, Title II
provides aggrieved individuals with a private cause of action.192
Title III of the ADA extends similar mandates to many private
entities. This Title addresses the treatment of individuals with
disabilities by “public accommodations” and prohibits disability-based
discrimination in the provision of goods, services, and other benefits.193
As defined in the ADA, “public accommodation” is a term of art
referring to any private entity whose operations affect commerce.194
This broad definition includes within its sweep much of the health care
industry – pharmacies, insurance companies, health care providers,
hospitals, and other service providers.195 This Title also covers public
transportation services provided by private entities.196 Title III requires
covered entities to modify their policies, procedures, architecture, and
communication mechanisms to accommodate individuals with
disabilities, unless doing so is not readily achievable.197 These
modifications, for example, entail installing ramps for wheelchairs,
furnishing TTY phone service for the hearing impaired, or changing
attendance or break policies. Like Title II, Title III provides a private
cause of action for those whose rights are violated.198
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 preceded the ADA by many years,
and it set an important, albeit somewhat narrow, precedent for
protection of individuals with disabilities. Section 504 of the Act199
190
Id. § 12132. A “public entity” is defined as (1) a state or local government; (2)
an instrumentality of a state or local government; or (3) the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation and any other commuter authority. Id. § 12131. Damages
have been allowed against states in Title II cases. In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
533-34 (2004), the Supreme Court held that private citizens may sue a state under
Title II of the ADA to enforce their right of access to a courthouse and that Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not bar such an action.
191
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2008).
192
42 U.S.C. § 12133.
193
Id. § 12182 (2000).
194
See id. § 12181(7) (2000).
195
Id. § 12181(7)(F).
196
Id. § 12184 (2000).
197
See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
198
Id. § 12188 (2000).
199
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
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protects individuals with disabilities, though it covers different parties
from those to which the ADA applies. The law establishes that
qualified individuals with disabilities200 may not, because of their
disabilities, be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or subjected to
discrimination by programs and activities that receive federal financial
support and those conducted by an executive agency of the United
States or the United States Postal Service.201
These laws establish strong antidiscrimination and accommodation
mandates for those with disabilities. However, Congress has qualified
these protections in two significant ways. First, under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act, covered entities need not accommodate
individuals with disabilities if doing so would constitute an undue
hardship.202 Second, Title III of the ADA and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act establish that covered entities need not allow
individuals who pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others to
benefit from their goods or services.203 These qualifications constitute
litigation barriers for some plaintiffs.
Establishing violations of these laws by emergency responders will
be particularly challenging. Plaintiffs will need to prove that the
alleged wrong was due specifically to their disabilities rather than to
the chaos of a disaster and that the defendant could have
accommodated their needs without undue hardship.204 Proving undue
hardship during a disaster will likely be much easier for defendants
than establishing this defense during ordinary times because a disaster
will severely strain human and financial resources. In addition, if
treating a patient with HIV or tuberculosis under suboptimal
emergency conditions would expose the provider or other patients to a
significant risk of infection, doctors may be able to prove that a direct

200
Federal regulations define a qualified person under section 504 as “a
handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
. . . services.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(1)(4) (2008).
201
29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (stating that Office of Personnel Management was subject to section 504
because it was executive agency of United States).
202
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2008); id. § 39.150(a)(2)
(2008).
203
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (defining “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services”); see 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (adopting definition of individual with disability provided in 29
U.S.C. § 705(20) (2006), which includes discussion of direct threat); 28 C.F.R. §
36.208 (2008).
204
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (establishing undue burden defense).
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threat existed.205 Furthermore, precedent establishes that patients will
not be successful in suing health care providers for ADA or
Rehabilitation Act violations relating to good-faith medical treatment
decisions.206
In addition, policies concerning the allocation of medical resources
that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities may not
be actionable. The Supreme Court rejected a disparate-impact
challenge in Alexander v. Choate,207 which involved Tennessee’s
reduction of the number of inpatient hospital days for which Medicaid
would pay.208 Evaluating the restriction under the Rehabilitation Act,
the Court upheld the State’s fourteen-day limitation even though
individuals with disabilities often have more extensive medical needs
than others.209 Since then, few disparate impact claims brought under
the ADA or Rehabilitation Act have succeeded.210
In spite of these obstacles, plaintiffs might be able to assert
successful disability discrimination claims in some circumstances.
First, they may succeed in cases of egregious misconduct or conduct
based on stereotypes and groundless assumptions about the
disabled.211 For example, if responders deem individuals with
disabilities to be of low priority for triaging purposes simply because
they have disabilities, they may violate disability rights statutes.212
Second, aggrieved individuals might be successful in suits that allege
deficient emergency response preparation. If emergency readiness

205

See sources cited supra note 203.
Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A] lawsuit under the
Rehab Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be based on medical
treatment decisions . . . .”); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144
(10th Cir. 2005) (“[P]urely medical decisions . . . do not ordinarily fall within the
scope of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.”).
207
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
208
Id. at 289.
209
Id. at 303-04.
210
Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1240 n.101 (2003) (“[E]ven
though the ADA explicitly recognizes disparate impact as a cognizable model of
discrimination under the Act, almost no ADA disability disparate impact cases exist.”).
But see Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 62 F. Supp. 2d 762, 776-77
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on claim that zoning
restrictions on assisted living facilities had disparate impact on disabled individuals).
211
See NANCY LEE JONES, AMERICAN LAW DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA): ALLOCATION OF SCARCE MEDICAL RESOURCES
DURING A PANDEMIC 14 (2006), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/
bitstream/handle/10207/2809/RL33381_200060421.pdf?sequence=1.
212
Id.
206
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planners ignore the needs of individuals with disabilities, plaintiffs
who find themselves without means of evacuation, communication, or
access to other services during an emergency might prevail. Planners
operating in the absence of the chaotic circumstances of an actual
emergency could find it difficult to establish undue burden as a
rationale for their failure to prepare for the needs of individuals with
disabilities. However, because of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
federal sovereign immunity, and qualified immunity,213 plaintiffs may
not be able to obtain monetary relief from governmental actors
involved in emergency preparedness.214
It is important to emphasize that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
establish a dual mandate of nondiscrimination and accommodation.215
These laws require covered entities not only to eschew discrimination,
but also to take affirmative steps to accommodate the needs of
individuals with disabilities. This dual commitment is particularly
important in the context of emergencies, when individuals with
physical and mental impairments have many special needs.216
(2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Whereas the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts protect individuals with
disabilities from discrimination, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits racial discrimination, broadly defined. The law
prohibits programs or activities receiving federal funds from engaging

213

See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (“[I]nsofar as Title II
creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity.”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004) (holding that private
citizens may sue state under Title II of ADA to enforce their rights of access to
courthouse and that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar such action).
However, it is unclear whether damages could be obtained in Title II cases that do not
allege a violation of fundamental rights. See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of
Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 465 (2007).
215
See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
216
Several scholars have argued that the ADA’s current reasonable accommodation
mandate is insufficient to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities and that
further assistance or alternative models must be used to serve the needs of this
population. See generally Samuel Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE
L.J. 1 (2004) (arguing for move to social welfare model to address needs of individuals
with disabilities, including government assistance such as public funding and public
health insurance); Satz, supra note 35 (arguing for blending of civil rights and social
welfare approaches to disability rights); Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights,
95 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2007) (developing “disability human rights paradigm”).
214
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in discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.217
Federal regulations promulgated by a variety of agencies pursuant to
Title VI prohibit not only intentional discrimination but also actions
that have a disparate impact on covered groups.218 The statute features
administrative enforcement provisions that allow federal agencies,
such as the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil
Rights,219 to enforce violations of the statute.220 In Alexander v.
Sandoval,221 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs do not have a
private cause of action to litigate disparate-impact cases under Title
VI.222 However, aggrieved individuals retain a private cause of action
to challenge intentional violations of the statute.223
Because it is very difficult to prove discriminatory intent, plaintiffs
have rarely prevailed in disparate treatment cases under the statute.224
Nevertheless, aggrieved individuals who believe that federally and
state-funded programs deliberately denied disaster-related services to
them because of their race, color, or national origin may seek relief
under Title VI. More importantly, regardless of litigation prospects,
these programs should comply with the statutory directives and

217

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”).
218
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2008) (providing that recipients may not use
“criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination”); see also Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 592
n.13 (1983) (noting that “every Cabinet department and about [40] federal agencies
adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination”).
219
See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of
Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 224 (2003).
220
Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 23, 2000), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000d app. At 4-401 to -403 (2000); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Disastrous
Disasters: Restoring Civil Rights Protections for Victims of the State in Natural Disasters,
2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 230 (2006) (stating that “private plaintiffs may
prosecute intentional discrimination by bringing disparate treatment claims under
Title VI, or plaintiffs may rely upon administrative enforcement through the Office for
Civil Rights (OCR),” but noting that, “[o]ver the past decade . . . the OCR’s
enforcement record has been lackluster, its staff has been reduced, and its budgets
have been cut”).
221
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
222
Id. at 285.
223
See id. at 284; see also Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of
Action: The Court’s Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in
Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358, 360-61 (2008).
224
See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 219, at 227-29.
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ensure that they are not excluding protected groups from enjoying
available benefits.
2.

State Protections

Like the federal government, the states have enacted legal safeguards
to protect the rights of the disadvantaged. Many provisions, including
state equal protection clauses, disability laws, and other
antidiscrimination mandates, parallel federal laws. In addition, under
state common law, aggrieved individuals can sue for recovery based on
tort theory. This subpart examines the protections to which
vulnerable populations are entitled under state law.
a.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Many state constitutions establish equality mandates.225 Fifteen
states have equal protection provisions that are similar to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.226 Other states
have more specific constitutional provisions, such as ones that
prohibit discrimination based on sex or against individuals exercising
their civil rights.227
All fifty states have statutes that address disability rights, though
they vary in scope and content. In general, these state laws prohibit
discrimination based on disability and require that individuals with
disabilities enjoy access to goods and services and receive needed
accommodations.228
225

See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1055 (2003); Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97 (1985) .
226
Shaman, supra note 225, at 1055 (listing fifteen constitutional provisions).
227
Williams, supra note 225, at 1196 (stating that majority of state constitutions do
not include equal protection clauses, but rather various equality or nondiscrimination
provisions that vary in scope and content).
228
ALA. CODE §§ 21-7-2, -3 (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200, .230,
.255, 35.10.015 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1492.01-.05 (2004); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-123-314(c), 20-14-301 to -303 (2005 & 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(f),
54, 54.1 (West 2007); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 4450 (West Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 9-5-103, 24-34-601, 24-34-801 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-269, 46a-64,
46a-71 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501, 4504 (1999), tit.
16, §§ 9501, 9502 (1995), tit. 29, § 7306 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1402.01, .31,
.73, 7-1001, 7-1002 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 413.08(3),
553.501-.513, 760.08 (West Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-1 to -9 (2007);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 103-50, 347-13, 368-1.5, 489-3 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp.
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 56-702, -703, 67-5909 (2002 & 2006); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5/5-102, 30/2, 30/3 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
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In addition, some states have laws that parallel Title VI and prohibit
facilities, programs, and activities receiving state funding from
discriminating based on particular classifications. Under these
statutes, state funding recipients generally may not discriminate based
on disability, sex, age, race, color, religion, national origin, or
ancestry.229
32-3-1-2, 22-9-1-2, 22-13-4-1, 22-13-4-1.5 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 216.7, 216C.3, 216C.4 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 391101, 44-1009(c), 58-1303, 58-1304 (2000, 2005 & Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 198B.260, 258.500, 344.120 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1733, 40:1748,
46:1953, 46:2254, 49:146 (West 1999, 2001 & 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§
4591-92, tit. 17, § 1312, tit. 25, §§ 2701-02 (West 1964 & Supp. 2007); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 2-501 to -511 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §
12-202 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., HUMAN SERVICES §§ 7-702, 7-704 (West 2007);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5(b) (2007); MASS. CONST. amend. CXIV; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 22, § 13A, ch. 272, § 98 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 37.1102, .1302, .2302, 125.1351, .1361 (West 2001 & 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
256C.02, 363A.02, .11, .12, 471.464 -.467 (West 2004, 2007 & 2008); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-6-3 to -5, -101 to -125 (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 8.610-.657,
209.150, 213.065 (West 2000 & 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102, 49-2-304, 308, 49-4-202, -211, 50-60-201(4) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-126, -127, 81-5, 147
(1997 & 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 338.180, 651.070 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp.
2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 155:39-b to -d, 167-C:1 to -D:1, 275-C:14, 354-A:16 to
-A:17 (LexisNexis 2002, 2008 & Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -4.1, -12(f)
(West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7(F), -7-3 (West 2000); N.Y. PUB. BLDGS.
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1996); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2) (McKinney Supp. 2008);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-2, -3, 168A-6, -7, -9 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-14, 15, 48-01.2-24 (Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3781.111, 4112.02(G) (West
2006 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1402, tit. 61, § 11 (West 2008 &
Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.142(3), .142(4), 447.210-.310 (2007); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 37-8-15, -15.1, 40-9.11, 42-87-2, -3 (1997 & 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-5-250, 43-33-10, -520, -530
(1976 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 5-14-12, -13, 20-13-23, -23.1, -24 (1994
& 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-120-202, -204 (2006); TEX. REV. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 121.001, .003 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2007); TEX. REV. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§
469.003, .052 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-29-1 to -3, 62A-5b-103 (2007 &
Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(c), tit. 20, § 2902 (Supp. 2007); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 51.5-40, -44 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.031, 49.60.215,
70.84.010,.92.110 - .150 (West 2002, 2005 & 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-9(6),
5-15-4 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.13, 106.52(3) (West 2004 & Supp.
2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-6-501, 35-13-201 (2007).
229
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-1.5 (1993) (noting that no otherwise qualified
person with disabilities shall be subjected to discrimination by any program or activity
receiving state financial assistance); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120, .130, .145 (West
2006) (stating facilities supported directly or indirectly by government funds may not
discriminate on basis of disability, religion, race, national origin, and sex); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2254 (West 2003) (stating no disabled person shall be subjected to
discrimination by any program or activity that receives state financial assistance); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010(15)(e), .065 (West 2004) (establishing that all persons within
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These equality, disability discrimination, and civil rights
constitutional and statutory provisions, like their federal counterparts,
establish important guiding principles for policy makers, including
emergency planners and responders. In some cases, they may also
create opportunities for aggrieved individuals to pursue remedial
action through litigation.230 However, plaintiffs bringing cases under
state law are likely to face immunity and proof problems similar to
those that often hinder litigation under the parallel federal
provisions.231
b.

Common Law Remedies Through Tort

Another avenue for litigation is tort theory. Plaintiffs who are
dissatisfied with the treatment they received in the wake of a disaster
may bring negligence suits against emergency planners. The standard
of care in any negligence case is fact specific and depends on the
particular circumstances at issue. The court must assess whether the
defendant “proceed[ed] with such reasonable caution as a prudent
man would have exercised under such circumstances.”232

state are entitled to full and equal use of any place of public accommodation without
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or
disability and defining “public accommodation” as including any public facility
receiving state funds); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-132, -133 (1997) (establishing that all
persons within state are entitled to full and equal enjoyment of places of public
accommodation, without discrimination based on age, sex, national origin, or religion
and defining “public accommodation” as including any public facility supported in
whole or in part by public funds); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401-02 (West 2008)
(providing that it is discriminatory practice “to deny the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, accommodations, facilities, privileges and advantages of a place of
public accommodation because of race, religion, sex, origin, age or handicap” and that
places of public accommodation are establishments supported by government funds);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-2, -3 (2005) (establishing that businesses and places of
public accommodation may not discriminate against individuals based on “race, color,
sex, religion, ancestry or national origin” and defining “public accommodation” as
including any facility that receives substantial government support).
230
See sources cited supra note 229.
231
See supra notes 162-61, 204-05, 222, and accompanying text.
232
Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (C.P.) (affirming jury
verdict for plaintiff who was injured when fire that began in defendant’s haystack
burnt down his house); see also Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor:
Serving Two (Or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 165, 182 (2005)
(“[S]tandard of care is defined by reference to a physician using the knowledge, skill,
and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good
standing, good medical practice within the area of specialty practice, and reasonable,
customary, accepted care under the circumstances.”).
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Because the standard of care varies based on the particular
circumstances at issue, treatment that is adequate for healthy adults
may be negligent when provided to vulnerable people with special
needs, such as children, elderly persons, or disabled individuals.233
Thus, emergency response personnel and planners should be aware
that the treatment expected under the standard of care for vulnerable
populations may be different from what is appropriate for others.
Consequently, plaintiffs with special needs may find it easier to prove
negligence or gross negligence234 because response protocols that are
acceptable for the general population could be egregiously inadequate
for vulnerable individuals.235
As is the case under statutory law, however, many parties, such as
governmental actors and volunteers, will enjoy various degrees of
immunity for tort actions associated with discretionary good faith
emergency response activities.236 Immunity, however, generally is not
granted for gross negligence and willful misconduct.237 Furthermore,
officials may be exposed to liability if they are not performing
discretionary functions, for example, when they fail to follow clear
instructions in detailed emergency plans that do not require
significant judgment calls on the part of implementers.238 The issue of
liability and immunity in public health emergencies is discussed at
length in my prior work and will not be repeated here.239
B. Emergency Statutes Addressing the Needs of Vulnerable Populations
The constitutional, statutory, and common law protections
discussed above240 are general mandates that should not be suspended
during emergencies. However, because a number of legislatures have
recognized that the disadvantaged will have acute needs during and
after disasters, some emergency laws include provisions specifically
addressing the treatment of vulnerable populations. This subpart
233

See supra Part I (discussing needs of various vulnerable populations).
See supra note 66 (defining gross negligence).
235
See supra Part I.D (discussing special needs of children).
236
Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1937-49 (2008).
237
Id.
238
See Gordon v. City of Henderson, 766 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tenn. 1989)
(preserving negligence claims alleging that firemen were intoxicated and absent from
their duty station because these failures did not fall within “discretionary function”
exception of Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act).
239
Hoffman, supra note 236, at 1913-69.
240
See supra Part III.A.
234
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surveys federal and state emergency statutes that establish relevant
mandates for the planning, response, and recovery phases of disasters.
1.

Federal Law and Executive Action

The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act was passed by
Congress in December of 2006 in reaction to the failures of the
Hurricane Katrina response efforts.241 The law added a provision
entitled “At-risk individuals” to the Public Health Service Act.242 It
considers the “public health and medical needs of at-risk
individuals”243 to be a national goal. The Act defines “at-risk
individuals” as “children, pregnant women, senior citizens and other
individuals who have special needs in the event of a public health
emergency, as determined by the Secretary of Health.”244 The Act also
allows for, but does not require, the appointment of a Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) “Director of At-Risk Individuals”
for emergency preparedness purposes.245 Beyond these general
directives, the statute provides little guidance as to how to achieve its
preparedness goal.246
241
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120
Stat. 2831 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); James G. Hodge et al., The
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act: Improving Public Health Emergency
Response, 297 JAMA 1708, 1708 (2007).
242
42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16 (2006).
243
Id. § 300hh-16(1).
244
Id. § 300hh-1(b)(4)(B) (2006).
245
Id. § 300hh-16.
246
The provision instructs that the Secretary and a possible appointee, the Director
of At-Risk Individuals, shall:

(2) assist other Federal agencies responsible for planning for, responding
to, and recovering from public health emergencies in addressing the needs of
at-risk individuals;
(3) provide guidance to and ensure that recipients of State and local public
health grants include preparedness and response strategies and capabilities
that take into account the medical and public health needs of at-risk
individuals in the event of a public health emergency, as described in section
247d-3a(b)(2)(A)(iii) of this title;
(4) ensure that the contents of the strategic national stockpile take into
account at-risk populations as described in section 300hh-10(b)(3)(B) of
this title;
(5) oversee the progress of the Advisory Committee on At-Risk Individuals
and Public Health Emergencies established under section 247d-6(b)(2) of
this title and make recommendations with a focus on opportunities for
action based on the work of the Committee;
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An older law, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”), enacted in 1988, establishes a broad
nondiscrimination mandate to protect vulnerable populations.247 It
enables the President to declare an emergency or major disaster.248 A
federal emergency may be declared at the request of a governor249 or, in
some circumstances, at the President’s own initiative.250 Section 308 of
the Stafford Act251 empowers the President to issue regulations to
govern the provision of federal assistance at the location of major
disasters and emergencies. These regulations, however, must ensure
that authorities accomplish relief activities “without discrimination on
the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, disability,
English proficiency, or economic status.”252 Federal governmental
entities and other organizations supplying or receiving disaster
assistance must comply with the regulations that the President
promulgates.253 Section 308, however, does not establish a private cause
of action for violations, and no court thus far has found that an implied
cause of action exists.254 Nevertheless, its nondiscrimination mandate is
expansive, extending to English proficiency and economic status,
classifications that are not covered by other federal laws and not
traditionally deemed to be protected within the American legal system.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Congress passed the PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which created
the position of Disability Coordinator in FEMA to aid in disaster

(6) oversee curriculum development for the public health and medical
response training program on medical management of casualties, as it
concerns at-risk individuals as described in subparagraphs (A) through (C)
of section 247d-16(a)(2) of this title; [and]
(7) disseminate novel and best practices of outreach to and care of at-risk
individuals before, during, and following public health emergencies.
Id.
247

42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2000).
Id. §§ 5170, 5191.
249
Id. § 5191(a).
250
Id. § 5191(b). Such an emergency was declared by President Clinton after the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. See
Letter from Bill Clinton, President, to James Lee Witt, FEMA Dir. on Disaster
Assistance to Okla. City (Apr. 19, 1995) (http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1995_public_papers_vol1_misc&page=553&position=all).
251
42 U.S.C. § 5151.
252
Id. § 5151(a).
253
Id. § 5151(b).
254
Farber, supra note 80, at 310-11.
248
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planning for individuals with disabilities.255 More specifically, the
Coordinator is tasked with the following duties: (1) interact with
relevant government agencies regarding the needs of the disabled; (2)
consult with organizations representing the interests of the disabled;
(3) disseminate best practices and model evacuation plans; (4)
develop training material concerning the needs of individuals with
disabilities in a disaster; (5) promote accessibility of communication
mechanisms, such as telephone hotlines, television and other
programming, and websites with information about disaster relief; (6)
ensure that accessible transportation is available for the disabled; and
(7) work to ensure that appropriate post-event residence and
relocation options are available for those with disabilities.256 The law
is detailed and provides considerable guidance for the responsible
official as to first steps that should be taken to protect the disabled
community in case of disaster. It does not, however, cover any at-risk
groups other than the disabled. The Act does not mandate any similar
planning efforts for minorities, children, the impoverished, and others.
Individuals with disabilities are also the subject of an executive
order designed to provide them with additional protection. On July
22, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,347, entitled
“Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness,” which
promotes consideration of the safety and security of the disabled
during emergencies257 and establishes the Interagency Coordinating
Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities
in the Department of Homeland Security.258 The Department of
Homeland Security also expressed concern about individuals with
disabilities in 2006 and issued a report finding that they were
inadequately integrated into emergency readiness plans.259

255

6 U.S.C. § 321b(a) (2006); Press Release, FEMA, Cindy Daniel Named FEMA’s
Disability Coordinator (June 21, 2007) (http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?
id=37220).
256
6 U.S.C. § 321b(a).
257
Exec. Order No. 13,347, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,573 (July 22, 2004), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2005/janqtr/pdf/3CFR13347.pdf.
258
Id.; see INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COUNCIL ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXECUTIVE ORDER 13347: PROGRESS REPORT
JULY 2005 – SEPTEMBER 2006, at 6, available at http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/
pdf/icc_0506_progress.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (reporting on preparedness
progress achieved through Council’s efforts).
259
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW PHASE 2 REPORT 41, 46-47
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf.
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The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has similarly stepped in to
provide government agencies with guidance as to emergency
preparedness for the disabled. In the same year that President Bush
signed his executive order, the DOJ issued guidance for local
governments entitled “Making Community Emergency Preparedness
and Response Programs Accessible to People with Disabilities.”260
That document urged governmental entities to include individuals
with disabilities in planning efforts.261
It also suggested the
establishment of a voluntary and adequately confidential registry of
people with disabilities so that local officials can provide individual
assistance to those in need.262 In particular, it emphasized planning
requirements in the following areas that impact people with
disabilities: (1) methods of communication must include both visual
messages and audio announcements so that they are usable by people
with visual and hearing impairments; (2) evacuation plans should be
designed to accommodate individuals with mobility, vision, hearing,
cognitive, and mental health impairments; (3) planners should
identify all accessible modes of transportation, such as lift-equipped
buses, that could be available during an emergency; (4) shelters must
be fully accessible, staffed with individuals who are educated about the
special needs of individuals with disabilities (e.g., mobility assistance,
help dressing, and communication), equipped with refrigeration,
back-up power, and other necessities for people who need medication
or assistive devices (e.g., wheel chairs), and willing to house service
animals even if pets are generally disallowed; and (5) facilities and
trailers that will temporarily house individuals with disabilities must
be accessible and appropriately equipped.263
2.

State Law

All states have their own emergency laws, which enable governors
or other state authorities to declare state emergencies.264
A
260
U.S. Department of Justice, An ADA Guide for Local Governments: Making
Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible to People
with Disabilities, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/emergencyprepguide.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
(ESAR-VHP) — LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 24 (2006), available at
ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/bioterror/May_06_Legal_Report.pdf [hereinafter ESAR-VHP]. For a
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comprehensive review of state emergency statutes reveals that some
contain provisions focusing on vulnerable populations, though these
statutes vary widely in scope and content. However, emergency
statutes in over half the states contain no reference to vulnerable
populations.265
A few states have adopted antidiscrimination provisions that apply
specifically to disaster relief activities.266 These protect vulnerable
populations by prohibiting discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, age, national origin, ancestry, and economic status, and
they prohibit discrimination by individuals or entities furnishing
disaster relief services.267
Some states have taken steps to ensure that the disabled are
specifically considered in the course of emergency planning efforts. A
number of state provisions instruct in relatively general terms that
planning initiatives should be undertaken.268 Several states provide for
the appointment of state officials with responsibility for individuals
with disabilities.269 Three states have established registries of disabled
people.270 Individuals are encouraged to register prior to disasters so
that they can more easily receive assistance.271 Other states specifically
address the need for accessible shelters,272 telecommunication,273
list of state laws and their definitions of “emergency” or “disaster,” see id. at 79-89
app. B.
265
See infra notes 266-79 and accompanying text (describing existing statutory
provisions).
266
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-15 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 166A-12
(West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8a-501(1) (West 2007) (prohibiting
discrimination only in provision of emergency medical services).
267
See sources cited supra note 266.
268
ALA. CODE § 31-9B-3 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8589.6 (West
2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.356 (West Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T § 92403 (West 2004) (focusing only on deaf and hard of hearing); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
22(2)(b)(12) (West Supp. 2008).
269
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8588.15 (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15-6 (Supp.
2007); Press Release, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Florida Officials Announce
Chip Wilson as Statewide Disability Coordinator (Nov. 5, 2007) (http://
www.apd.myflorida.com/news/2007/statewide-disability-coordinator-announced.htm).
270
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8589.6(b)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.355 (West Supp. 2008);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 23-a (West 2002); see also New Jersey Office of Emergency
Management, Now’s the Time to Get “Hurricane Ready” and Sign Up for NJ’s Special
Needs Registry for Disasters, http://www.capemaycountygov.net/Cit-e-Access/
webpage.cfm?TID=5&TPID=9194 (indicating that six New Jersey counties have
created voluntary, special needs registries for people with disabilities that will be used
during disasters).
271
See sources cited supra note 270.
272
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.385(2)(b) (West Supp. 2008).
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informational materials and educational outreach,274 or for evacuation
plans designed to accommodate individuals with disabilities.275
Finally, some states also address disaster relief planning for other
vulnerable populations. Connecticut focuses on inmates of state
institutions and children in schools.276 Other states focus on welfare
recipients or low-income residents,277 elderly people,278 and
individuals with limited English language proficiency.279
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING EXISTING LAW TO IMPROVE
ASSISTANCE FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN DISASTERS
Successful response efforts are dependent upon effective planning
and preparedness initiatives. The question of how best to plan for the
needs of various vulnerable groups during disasters is not new. Many
experts have given the matter considerable thought and delineated

273
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-24(a)(1), -25b(b) (West Supp. 2008); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 401.773 (West 2007).
274
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.35(2)(a),(i)-(j) (West Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 37-B, § 704 (Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 6701 (West 2004).
275
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 to /125 (West 2004) (requiring owners of high
rise buildings to plan for evacuation of disabled occupants during disaster and make
their plans available to police); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.272 (West 2007) (providing
that Office of Emergency Management shall develop plan for safely evacuating service
animals and people who use them, with emphasis on protecting human life).
276
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9(e) (West Supp. 2008) (“The governor shall take
appropriate measures for protecting the health and safety of inmates of state
institutions and children in schools.”).
277
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 521 (1997) (directing state to provide funding for
welfare-receiving households in disasters, including emergency shelter, mortgage or
rent assistance, and other costs relating to self-sufficiency of household); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 7-2231.08 (LexisNexis 2008) (“The Agency shall also pay particular attention
to the needs of senior citizens and low-income residents in establishing an effective
homeland security public warning and information capability.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 3761 (2004) (allowing state to provide assistance to needy families with
children who are deprived of basic necessities because of emergency); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 22(2)(b)(12) (West Supp. 2008) (stating state disaster plan should pay particular
attention to needs of poor).
278
D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2231.08 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring special attention to
needs of senior citizens); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 704 (addressing provision of
educational material to elderly); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 22(2)(b)(12) (West Supp. 2008)
(recommending state disaster plan to pay particular attention to needs of elderly).
279
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8589.6(b)(2) (West 2005) (establishing registries for those
with English language deficiencies and elderly persons); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
252.35(2)(j) (requiring establishment of educational outreach program); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 704 (addressing provision of educational material to this
population).
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careful suggestions.280 However, thus far, specific planning guidelines
have generally not been adopted as legal requirements that are
bolstered by political accountability and enforcement mechanisms.
This Part analyzes the shortcoming of American law insofar as it
addresses the needs of vulnerable populations in disasters. It then
develops recommendations to address the current gaps and
shortcomings of the law. It is only with educated, sensitive, and
responsible planning that we can avoid repeating the many failures
that the disadvantaged have suffered in past disasters.
A. Where Existing Law Falls Short
While numerous legal provisions establish equality and
nondiscrimination mandates as well as affirmative duties towards
vulnerable populations, these laws are insufficient to protect the needs
of the vulnerable during disasters. In principle, these mandates and
duties apply both in ordinary times and during emergencies.281 As
discussed in Part III, these include the Equal Protection Clause, the
Eighth Amendment, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and state constitutional equal protection
provisions, disability laws, and civil rights statutes.282 With all these
laws in place, it might be tempting to argue that vulnerable
populations already have adequate legal protections. Unfortunately,
the difficulty litigants have in vindicating their rights under current
law283 necessitates more rigorous protection.
Relying on litigation as the primary safeguard for the rights of the
disadvantaged raises at least four significant concerns. First, those
who die or are permanently disabled as a result of emergency
responders’ acts or omissions can never be made whole, even if they
are able to prove liability. Second, various sources of immunity
protect governmental actors, volunteers, and others from liability
related to disaster response activities.284 Third, juries might believe
that under chaotic, exigent circumstances, responders performed as
well as possible, that response shortcomings must be forgiven, and
that inequities were inevitable. Fourth, the disadvantaged might not
be able to afford to litigate claims to vindicate their rights.
280
281
282
283
284

text.

See infra Part IV.B (discussing recommendations offered by preparedness experts).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.
See Hoffman, supra note 236, at 1937-54; supra notes 155-61 and accompanying
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Consequently, litigation is unlikely to provide adequate relief to
aggrieved parties in the aftermath of a disaster.
In light of these limitations, some legislatures have recognized that
appropriate planning is of critical importance to the disadvantaged.
These legislatures realize that prospectively preventing harm to the
vulnerable is vastly superior to relying on a retroactive remedial
system. As a result, a limited number of relevant federal and state
preparedness provisions have been enacted.285 Unfortunately, they fall
far short of providing a comprehensive protection scheme.
The federal and state laws constitute a patchwork of legislation that
leaves many gaps and unanswered questions. For example, the Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (“PAHPA”) allows for the optional
appointment of a “Director of At-Risk Individuals” in the Department of
Health and Human Services but does not require this appointment.286 It
also provides no guidance as to how this official is to achieve
preparedness goals.287 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006 mandates that FEMA must have a Disability Coordinator but
does not address preparedness for any other vulnerable population.288
Moreover, state protections vary widely. While some states require a
limited number of emergency planning initiatives for vulnerable
populations,289 other states ignore the topic of emergency preparedness
for the disadvantaged altogether.290 No state provides a comprehensive
preparedness approach.
Existing laws do not consistently designate officials who will be
responsible for emergency preparedness for the disadvantaged and
who will be publicly accountable in case of failures. Nor do the
statutes provide extensive, detailed guidance as to what steps should
be taken to address the needs of vulnerable populations in disasters.
Without mechanisms to ensure accountability and without specific
requirements, appropriate preparedness is unlikely to be
accomplished. In the absence of strong statutory mandates, vulnerable
populations, who often have weak political voices,291 may not
represent a priority for emergency planners. Consequently, further
legislative intervention is needed.

285
286
287
288
289
290
291

See supra Part III.B.
42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16 (2006).
Id.
6 U.S.C. § 321b(a) (2006).
See supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part III.B.2.
Law & Ensminger, supra note 25, at 81.
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B. Specific Recommendations
A critically important mechanism for the promotion of the interests
of disadvantaged communities is federal and state emergency response
legislation.
Both federal and state laws addressing emergency
preparedness for vulnerable populations should be revised and
strengthened to maximize disaster readiness. The suggested legal
interventions are designed to bolster accountability and ensure that
specific tasks are undertaken to promote the interests of the
disadvantaged during disasters.
1.

Enhancing Accountability

Federal and state statutes should require the designation of officials
with specific responsibility for vulnerable groups in emergencies.
Government officials who are required by law to engage in various
planning activities are likely to be motivated to achieve preparedness
goals because they will be judged based on their performance.
Administrations that fail in their planning and response efforts may
suffer serious political consequences, and individual officials may lose
their jobs, as was the case after Hurricane Katrina.292
Federal law should thus provide for greater accountability.
Congress should amend PAHPA to require the appointment of a
Director of At-Risk Individuals rather than leaving such an
appointment to the discretion of the Health and Human Services
Secretary.293 Following the example of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006, PAHPA or associated federal
regulations should also develop more detailed requirements as to the
tasks that the Director must accomplish.294 Under PAHPA, the
Secretary was obligated to submit a report to Congress concerning
preparedness progress by December 19, 2007.295 Such reports should
be required on an annual basis and should be publicly available.
PAHPA, however, is not the only federal law that must be amended
in order to provide comprehensive protection to vulnerable

292
Christine Hauser, Three Days After Losing Katrina Duties, FEMA Chief Resigns
Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/national/
nationalspecial/12cnd-fema.html.
293
42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16 (2006).
294
See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.2 for
suggestions as to specific requirements.
295
42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16(8); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC AND ALL
HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS ACT PROGRESS REPORT 14-16 (2007), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/conference/pahpa/2007/pahpa-progress-report-102907.pdf.
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populations in disasters. The Act governs only one type of disaster —
public health emergencies.296 It is important that federal legislation
require preparedness planning for a wide range of federally declared
disasters.297 Congress should therefore amend the more broadly
applicable Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act as well.298
The statutorily established position of FEMA Disability Coordinator299
should be expanded to encompass coordination of emergency
preparedness for all vulnerable populations and not solely for
individuals with disabilities.300 The statute should include a detailed
list of tasks that addresses not only the needs of individuals with
disabilities,301 but also those of other vulnerable populations,302 and
should require publicly available annual progress reports.
The state emergency statutes should also require the appointment of
officials with specific responsibility for at-risk groups, because not all
emergencies will be declared at the federal level.303 Furthermore, the
activities of state and local responders may reach more individuals
than the assistance of federal authorities. Designated state officials
with explicit responsibility for vulnerable populations will be
accountable if they fail to perform their assigned duties and could
suffer job loss or political backlash. However, in order to be effective,
offices in charge of planning for at-risk populations would need to be
well funded and staffed, and thus, legislation must provide for
adequate financial appropriations.
2.

Detailed Planning Guidance

The federal and state emergency laws that address disaster
readiness for vulnerable populations should provide detailed
requirements to guide the work of the designated governmental
authorities, whom I will call vulnerable populations coordinators
(“VPCs”). The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act’s

296

42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006).
See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (discussing Stafford Act, which
authorizes President to declare national emergencies that are not public health
emergencies).
298
6 U.S.C. § 321b(a) (2006).
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
See id.
302
See infra Part IV.B.2 for suggested requirements.
303
ESAR-VHP, supra note 264, at 24. For a list of state laws and their definitions
of “emergency” or “disaster,” see id. at 79-89 app. B.
297
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list of duties304 and DOJ guidance305 can serve as a strong foundation
for statutory requirements regarding individuals with disabilities.
For recommendations concerning other vulnerable groups,
legislators can turn to existing state emergency laws306 and proposals
formulated by experts in the field.
General guidance can be drawn from the report of a panel of twentyfour experts from eleven countries who met in Bellagio, Italy, in July
2006.307 They were tasked with formulating recommendations to
mitigate and prevent unjust outcomes for the world’s disadvantaged in
the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak.308 The experts, who
became known as the “Bellagio Group,” created a “Checklist for
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plans” consisting of
three action items for emergency planners: (1) identify traditionally
disadvantaged populations and those likely to be disproportionately
harmed by a pandemic; (2) involve these groups in planning
initiatives; and (3) identify and address the needs of vulnerable
populations likely to arise from a pandemic.309
Many advocates and scholars have applied similar criteria to
formulate more detailed recommendations for vulnerable groups. For
example, experts have stressed the importance of obtaining input
directly from affected communities.310 Federal and state officials
should be statutorily required to consult with representatives of the
various vulnerable populations because these individuals may be in
the best position to assess and articulate their needs.311
Representatives could be chosen from among the leadership of major
advocacy organizations, such as the National Council on Disability
and the AARP.

304

6 U.S.C. § 321b(b) (2006).
See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
306
See supra Part III.B.2.
307
Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6, at 33.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1274 (reporting that some state and local
government agencies have also involved minority groups in discussions concerning
how best to communicate with and serve particular communities in emergencies);
Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6, at 33.
311
See 6 U.S.C. § 321b(b)(3) (2006) (requiring Disability Coordinator to consult
“with organizations that represent the interests and rights of individuals with
disabilities about the needs of individuals with disabilities in emergency planning
requirements and relief efforts”). In the case of children, undocumented persons, and
prisoners, it will most likely be necessary to rely upon advocates who represent their
interests rather than members of these populations themselves.
305
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Statutes should also obligate VPCs to ensure that modes of
communication, educational materials, shelters, transportation,
medical supplies, and other resources are accessible to disabled,
elderly, or impoverished individuals, children, those who are not
proficient in English, and others who are disadvantaged.312 More
specifically, with respect to children, the statutes should list the
following goals, recommended by the Institute of Medicine: (1)
establish protocols to minimize separations between parents and
children and expedite reunions in case of unavoidable separations; (2)
improve pediatric expertise among health care providers involved in
emergency response activities; (3) develop pediatric surge capacities;
(4) supply social, medical, and mental health services that are
appropriate for children; and (5) at least every two years conduct
disaster drills that include a hypothetical pediatric mass casualty
event.313 In addition, to protect elderly and disabled individuals with
limited mobility, the statutes should require support for homebound
individuals and the provision of home health care services, to the
extent possible.314
VPCs should also be required to safeguard the welfare of ethnic
minorities and those with language barriers through specific measures.
These include the following steps: (1) promoting culturally sensitive,
accurate, and easily understood translation of written and verbal
communication; (2) increasing use of technology, such as audio and
video tools for those with poor reading comprehension; (3)
conducting tabletop training exercises geared towards minority
communities that address issues such as distrust of governmental
authorities,315 availability of translators, and other culturally relevant
issues; and (4) creating centralized information resources that enable
agencies and organizations serving minorities to access appropriate
materials and experts.316
312
Id. § 321b(b) (requiring FEMA Disability Coordinator to promote accessibility
of communication mechanisms, transportation, and temporary housing).
313
INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 239.
314
Aldrich & Benson, supra note 50, at 3.
315
Some individuals may distrust government authorities based on their personal
experiences or their identification with a group that has been historically oppressed.
African Americans, for example, may distrust government-provided medical services
because of a long history of abuses, including the Tuskegee syphilis trial. See Sharona
Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 426-27
(2005). Illegal aliens may distrust offers of government assistance in disasters because
they fear being prosecuted for immigration violations. See supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
316
Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1275-77.
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The vulnerable populations for which VPCs are responsible should
include prisoners. The VPCs should oversee efforts to develop plans
for the efficient and safe evacuation of prisons and jails,317 ensuring
that prison authorities conduct disaster drills, coordinate across
departmental lines, and have designated facilities that can receive
evacuees who are inmates.318
Emergency statutes should also address the creation of voluntary
registries to store information about those who are most likely to be
isolated and to lack mobility and communication modes during an
emergency. These include individuals with disabilities,319 elderly persons,
and those with English language barriers.320 Registries would allow
responders to locate those with special needs and would facilitate efforts
to reach them for purposes of evacuation or delivery of information and
supplies. Both local authorities and advocacy organizations should
educate at-risk communities about the registries and encourage
individuals to provide the necessary information. Although data would
be accessible to authorized individuals during emergencies, registry
operators would need to implement safeguards so that confidentiality is
maintained. Vulnerable people are unlikely to register if they believe that
their identities, medical conditions, and contact information might be
sold to marketers or disclosed to other third parties.
Widespread use of electronic health record systems would
significantly enhance the efficacy of registries, enabling optimal
treatment of victims once they are located.321 These systems would
prevent medical records from being lost, allow responders to locate
critical information through electronic searches, alert clinicians to
patients’ medical histories, allergies, or drug lists, and facilitate
treatment in many other ways.322
317

See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 75, at 10-11.
Id. at 11; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING CHECKLIST 1-8 (2007),
available
at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/workplaceplanning/correctionchecklist.pdf.
319
New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, supra note 270 (reporting that
six New Jersey counties have created voluntary, special needs registry for people with
disabilities that will be used during disasters).
320
See supra notes 270 and 279 and accompanying text (discussing states that have
already established registries).
321
See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for
Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
103, 112-19 (2008) (discussing benefits of EHR systems).
322
Id.; see also Robert Steinbrook, Health Care and the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, 360 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1057, 1057 (2009) (explaining that President
Obama’s stimulus legislation, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
provides “$19.2 billion for health information technology.”).
318
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It should be noted that government agencies may contract with
private parties for the delivery of some services, such as transportation
or distribution of medical supplies, to the public. The relevant
statutory provisions should require that in such cases, contracts
between the state and private parties obligate the provider of services
to plan for and be prepared to address the needs of vulnerable
populations.323 Failure to plan appropriately would constitute breach
of contract that would be actionable by the state government.
Moreover, all state emergency response laws should contain explicit
nondiscrimination mandates.324
Following the Stafford Act’s
precedent,325 all states should include provisions that prohibit
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin,
ancestry, economic status, or disability326 in the provision of statesponsored disaster assistance. Responders and recipients of aid who are
found to violate these provisions would be deemed to have breached
their disaster relief contracts with the state or forfeit state funding.327
These recommendations do not demand the creation of new private
causes of action for aggrieved individuals beyond those that already
exist.328 As argued in previous work, liability for response activities
can have the adverse effect of discouraging participation in emergency
operations329 and therefore must be approached with great caution by
legislators. Even without the threat of new causes of action, the
proposed statutory provisions should galvanize politically accountable
emergency planners and focus their attention on the fate of the
disadvantaged.
The recommended requirements would follow a long-established
tradition in American law and policy of both prohibiting
discrimination against the vulnerable and devoting significant and
often disproportionate resources to promoting the welfare of the
323
See ALA. CODE § 31-9B-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (requiring that state agencies
include emergency planning requirements in contracts for care of disabled).
324
See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text (discussing states that already
have such provisions).
325
42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2000).
326
These laws could incorporate by reference existing state laws that prohibit
discrimination based on various classifications and emphasize that the mandates apply
even during emergencies. For example, all states have laws that prohibit disabilitybased discrimination. See supra note 228.
327
See 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (deeming compliance with Stafford Act’s antidiscrimination mandate to be “a condition of participation in the distribution of
assistance or supplies under this chapter or of receiving assistance”).
328
See supra Part III.
329
Hoffman, supra note 236, at 1917, 1955-56.
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disadvantaged. These commitments are manifested in constitutional
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth
Amendment, disability laws such as the ADA and IDEA, public
programs such as Medicaid and SCHIP,330 and a limited number of
existing federal and state emergency laws.331 The suggested approach,
consequently, is not unprecedented and should be embraced by the
government and American public.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that during emergencies vulnerable populations will have
special needs and require particular attention.332 However, despite
significant investment of resources in emergency preparedness at the
federal and state levels,333 progress for special needs groups remains
slow, and many have identified severe planning and readiness gaps in
this area.334 For these populations, emergency response failures can
have catastrophic consequences, including loss of the ability to work or
live independently, permanent injury, and death.335 As the Hurricane
Katrina experience made clear, preparedness fiascos will result in
humiliation and a loss of public faith in the government as well.336
In the context of emergencies, vulnerable populations include a
large spectrum of groups: individuals with physical and mental
impairments, elderly persons, those with language barriers, children,
pregnant women, the impoverished, certain ethnic minorities,
undocumented persons, and prisoners.337 Some segment of each of
these populations is likely to require acute attention.
While
individuals with disabilities have drawn some attention in
preparedness circles,338 other vulnerable populations have been all but
ignored.339
330

See supra notes 134-41; Part III.
See supra Part III.B.
332
See supra Part I.
333
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
334
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, KEY FINDINGS FROM PUBLIC HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS: MOBILIZING STATE BY STATE 5 (2008), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
publications/feb08phprep/pdf/feb08phpkeyfindings.pdf (focusing on preparedness
challenges); Gostin, supra note 127, at 3 (arguing that current influenza plans fail to
address special needs of vulnerable groups).
335
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
336
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
337
See supra Part I.
338
See supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text.
339
See Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6, at 38 (emphasizing that few pandemic
331
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This Article has argued that vulnerable populations will enjoy
meaningful protection only if emergency plans and preparedness
initiatives anticipate and address their needs. Without appropriate
planning, response efforts are unlikely to be adequate for at-risk
communities. A robust legal framework already requires that the
welfare of vulnerable groups be safeguarded. These are federal and
state disability rights laws, the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and equivalent state laws, the Eighth
Amendment, PAHPA, the Stafford Act, and various state laws.340
Emergency planners and responders operating at the pre-event, event,
and recovery phases should bear in mind the mandates and spirit of
these legal provisions. These laws establish a commitment to eschew
discrimination against vulnerable populations and require that
affirmative steps be taken to safeguard the welfare of the
disadvantaged. In addition, several distributive justice theories justify
allocation of scarce resources to members of vulnerable populations
even if they require more intensive care or disproportionately large
resource investments when compared to others.341 It is also important
to emphasize that disaster readiness for vulnerable populations goes
hand in hand with preparedness for the general population. If those
without special needs are well equipped to react appropriately and
care for themselves during emergencies, the vulnerable are more likely
to enjoy good outcomes because more resources will be available to
serve those who require extra assistance.
Nevertheless, a careful critique reveals that existing mandates are
insufficient to protect the welfare of at-risk groups during disasters.
Consequently, this Article has formulated detailed recommendations for
revision and improvement of federal and state emergency laws so that
they more effectively promote the interests of those in greatest need.
The recommendations and guidelines reviewed in this Article
demonstrate that much can be done to anticipate and address the
needs of the vulnerable during catastrophic events. Adequate
planning will go far to minimize the extent to which these groups
suffer disproportionately and experience devastating outcomes.
Responsible emergency preparedness and response efforts are critical
to preventing disasters from ending or ravaging the lives of society’s
disadvantaged members.

preparedness plans address needs of disadvantaged groups).
340
See supra Part III.
341
See supra Part II.

